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I. INTRODUCTION
Like a damaged ship that refuses to sink or a tenacious heavyweight
fighter who refuses to lie down for the count, Samuel Warren's and
Louis Brandeis' invasion of privacy tort' refuses to slip into submission.
The tort has not only survived repeated assaults by commentators and
First Amendment enthusiasts, but recent case law suggests it may be on
the verge of a significant comeback.
2
The common law tort of "public disclosure of private facts"3 has led
an exciting life since introduced by Warren and Brandeis over a century
ago.' In their famous law review article, The Right to Privacy, the
authors warned that the press, a big business enterprise, was invading the
privacy of citizens through the use of "instantaneous photographs" and
"numerous mechanical devices."5  Although the courts did not
I. For a detailed discussion of Warren's and Brandeis' proposed tort, see infra
notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
2. See ifra Part lV.
3. Hereinafter the private facts tort.
4. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L.
REv. 193 (1890).
5. Id. at 195.
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immediately recognize the proposed right to privacy, by the mid-
twentieth century some version of an individual's "right to be let alone"6
was recognized by a majority of American jurisdictions.7 As noted by
one state supreme court, "[a]cceptance of the right to privacy has grown
with the increasing capability of the mass media and electronic devices
with their capacity to destroy an individual's anonymity, intrude upon
his most intimate activities, and expose his most personal characteristics
to public gaze." The American Law Institute followed the emerging
trend of case law by recognizing the private facts tort in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts
However, the private facts tort has not received universal acceptance.
Due to the potential liability of media defendants, the tort has come
under intense attack on constitutional grounds.' Critics argue the tort
undermines First Amendment protection for freedom of expression." As
a result of this constitutional conflict, many courts have been reluctant to
hold defendants liable for the public disclosure of private facts, leading
to "rare, unpredictable awards of damages." 2 Constitutional concerns
have been so great that many recent authors have declared the private
facts tort null and void.
3
6. Id.
7. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 386-88 (1960)
(declaring that the private facts tort had been adopted in 27 jurisdictions, probably would
be adopted in seven additional jurisdictions, and was recognized in some form by four
state statutes).
8. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 37 (Cal. 1971).
9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). The Restatement
recognizes four forms of the invasion of privacy tort: "unreasonable intrusion upon the
seclusion of another"; "appropriation of another's name or likeness"; "public disclosure
of private facts"; and "publicity which unreasonably places another in a false light before
the public." Id. §§ 652B-652E.
10. See, e.g., Geoff Dendy, Note, The Newsworthiness Defense to the Public
Disclosure Tort, 85 KY. L.J. 147, 148 (1996-97) (stating that much criticism
accompanies the private facts tort due to censorship concerns).
11. See Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711,717 (N.C. 1988) (describing the private facts
tort as "constitutionally suspect" based on the Supreme Court's recognition of a potential
conflict with the First Amendment).
12. Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291, 362-64 (1983) (concluding that the
private facts tort should be abolished due to its ineffectiveness).
13. See id. at 351. See also Phillip E. DeLaTorre, Resurrecting a Sunken Ship: An
Analysis of Current Judicial Attitudes Toward Public Disclosure Claims, 38 Sw. L.J.
1151, 1184 (1985) (calling the private facts tort a "phantom tort"); Joseph Elford, Note,
Trafficking in Stolen Information: A "Hierarchy of Rights" Approach to the Private
Facts Tort, 105 YALE L.J. 727, 729 (1995) (proposing that the private facts tort is "on
the verge of collapsing under the weight of the First Amendment"); Lorelei Van Wey,
Rather than simply arguing the merits or shortfalls of the tort, this
Comment focuses instead on the subtle reemergence of the private facts
tort in factual scenarios Warren and Brandeis most likely could not
foresee one hundred years ago. Part II of the Comment briefly describes
the development of the private facts tort. Part III examines the
inevitable conflict between the private facts tort and the First
Amendment, and common law attempts to reconcile that conflict
through variations of the "newsworthiness" defense. 14 Part IV focuses
on the resurrection of the private facts tort in recent case law, due to
judicial limitation of the newsworthiness defense. Finally, after
examining the problems associated with the fragmented case law, Part V
proposes a new standard for determining newsworthiness-a standard
that considers the social use of the information, the extent of prying into
private lives for the information, and most importantly, the private or
public status of the victim.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIVATE FACTS TORT
It is suspected that the private facts tort is the result of excessive and
overbearing newspaper coverage of a late nineteenth century private
Boston socialite wedding. After the Saturday Evening Gazette and
other Boston newspapers "invaded" the wedding of attorney Samuel D.
Warren's daughter, he teamed up with his friend and future Supreme
Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis 6 to compose one of the most influential
law review articles in American history. 7 In the article, the authors
passionately argued that the resulting pain and distress from media
invasions of privacy far exceeded the injuries from any physical tort.'
Note, Private Facts Tort: The End Is Here, 52 OHIo ST. L.J. 299, 300 (1991) (claiming
that the Supreme Court's decision in Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989),
rendered the private facts tort extinct).
14. For a detailed discussion of the newsworthiness defense, see infra Part III.B.
15. See Prosser, supra note 7, at 383.
16. Louis D. Brandeis served on the United States Supreme Court from 1916 to
1939. See LEwis J. PAPER, BRANDEis 238-39, 391 (1983).
17. See Prosser, supra note 7, at 383.
18. Warren and Brandeis further stated:
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety
and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious,
but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as
effrontery .... [T]he details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the
daily papers .... The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon
advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world,
and man, under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to
publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more essential to the
individual; but modem enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon
his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be
inflicted by mere bodily injury.
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Therefore, they proposed a common law tort for invasion of the right to
privacy. Under their proposed tort, the media would be liable for the
written publication of truthful private matter, provided the publication
was not of public interest, privileged, or consented to by the injured
party.
9
Although the Warren and Brandeis article had little immediate legal
impact, it began a debate over the right to privacy that continues today.
In the early twentieth century, this debate slowly moved into the annals
of case law. One of the earliest cases to validate the private facts tort
was Melvin v. Reid.2° In Melvin, the California Court of Appeals upheld
a reformed prostitute's lawsuit against a film producer who used her
maiden name in a film depicting the true facts of her "former" life,
including that she had stood trial and was acquitted for murder.2' After
recognizing that "[a] reading of most of the decisions in jurisdictions
recognizing this right leaves the mind impressed with the lack of
uniformity in the reasoning employed by the various jurists supporting
it," the court summarized the "better reasoned" general principles
behind the right to privacy.' In finding for the plaintiff, the court
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 4, at 196.
19. See id. at 214-18. The private facts tort has been best described as an
extension of defamation, except that the private facts tort punishes the publication of
truthful non-newsworthy matter that is damaging to a person's reputation. See Prosser,
supra note 7, at 398.
20. 297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
21. See id. at 91.
22. Id.
23. The court defined the right to privacy as follows:
(1) The right of privacy was unknown to the ancient common law.
(2) It is an incident of the person and not of property-a tort for which a right
of recovery is given in some jurisdictions.
(3) It is a purely personal action, and does not survive, but dies with the
person.
(4) It does not exist where the person has published the matter complained of,
or consented thereto.
(5) It does not exist where a person has become so prominent that by his very
prominence he has dedicated his life to the public, and thereby waived his
right to privacy. There can be no privacy in that which is already public.
(6) It does not exist in the dissemination of news and news events, nor in the
discussion of events of the life of a person in whom the public has a
rightful interest, nor where the information would be of public benefit, as
in the case of a candidate for public office.
(7) The right of privacy can only be violated by printings, writings, pictures,
or other permanent publications or reproductions, and not by word of
mouth.
(8) The right of action accrues when the publication is made for gain or
proclaimed that rehabilitated members of society earned the opportunity
to continue along a path of seclusion, reasoning that throwing their lives
back into shame was contrary to the objectives of society.'
Another important, but inconsistent, decision in the emerging case law
was Sidis v. F-R Publishing,2' a matter involving a former child
prodigy. 6 The plaintiff in that case, who graduated from Harvard at the
age of sixteen but failed to succeed in the "real" world, was not allowed
to bury his past after The New Yorker published an unflattering "Where
Are They Now?" article about him years later.27 The court declared that
the public's interest in Sidis prevailed over his right to privacy.'
However, the court did not go so far as to declare newsworthiness an
absolute defense.29 By not addressing the outer limit of the defense, the
justices commenced a debate on the extent of the newsworthiness
defense that remains to be resolved.
Two decades later, perhaps the second most influential law review
article on the right to privacy was published. In Privacy, Dean William
L. Prosser attempted to solidify the emerging tort of invasion of
privacy. 0 He divided the tort of invasion of privacy into four separate
torts, one of which was the private facts tort.' As did Warren and
Brandeis, Prosser likened the private facts tort to an extension of
defamation, except that the publication was truthful.32 In order for a
plaintiff to recover under the proposed tort, the disclosure had to be
public, the facts had to be private, and the matter must have been highly
offensive to a reasonable person.3
However, Prosser also proposed bounds to the tort. In addition to
other limitations,' Prosser, like Warren and Brandeis, recognized the
privilege of publishing newsworthy events. 5 The privilege was not
profit.
Id. at 92-93.
24. See id. at 93.
25. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
26. See id. at 807.
27. See id. at 807-08.
28. See id. at 809.
29. See id.
30. See generally William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383 (1960)
(advocating the formal recognition of four torts that had arisen from the common law tort
of invasion of privacy).
31. See id.at 389.
32. See id. at 398; Warren & Brandeis, supra note 4, at 219.
33. See id. at 393-97.
34. For example, public figures had less of a right to privacy than did the average
citizen. See id. at 411. Additionally, consent served as an absolute defense. See id. at
419.
35. See id. at 412; see also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 4, at 214 ('The right to
privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter which is of public or general
494
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limited to current news, but "extend[ed] also to information or
education, or even entertainment and amusement, by books, articles,
pictures, films and broadcasts concerning interesting phases of human
activity in general, and the reproduction of the public scene as in
newsreels and travelogues."36  Included in this newsworthy category
were people who had not sought publicity, but rather lost their right to
privacy through involuntary involvement with a matter of
newsworthiness.37 In determining whether an individual fell into this
newsworthy category, Prosser required that there be "some logical
connection between the plaintiff and the matter of public interest.' 8
Prosser's influence was not limited to academic debate, as he served
as the original draftsman of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.39
However, prior to publication of the Restatement, a prominent decision
emerged from the California Supreme Court. In Briscoe v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n,4 a reformed truck hijacker sued the popular magazine after
his name and the details of his former hijacking were used in an article.
41
The article made no mention of the fact that the hijacking had occurred
eleven years prior or that plaintiff had abandoned his past life of crime.
42
Although the court acknowledged the facts of the past crime were
newsworthy, it followed the Melvin rationale by holding that identifying
plaintiffs name was not newsworthy because it served minimal
independent public purpose.43 However, the court also suggested that
some events and individuals might be so prominent that they would




38. Id. at 414. Whether known or unknown to Prosser, this "logical connection"
relationship would have a profound impact on future case law. See infra Part Il.B.5.
39. See RicHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1223 (6th ed.
1995).
40. 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971).
41. See id. at 35-36.
42. See id. at 36.
43. See id. at 40. Since Melvin and Briscoe both dealt with cases of reformed
criminals, a strong argument can be made that the judges were using the private facts tort
as an incentive for reforming criminals.
44. The Briscoe court stated:
There may be times, of course, when an event involving private citizens may
be so unique as to capture the imagination of all. In such cases-e.g., the
behavior of the passengers on the sinking Titanic, the heroism of Nathan Hale,
the horror of the Saint Valentine's Day Massacre-purely private individuals
may by an accident of history lose their privacy regarding that incident for all
A few years later, the Restatement (Second) of Torts solidified the
private facts tort as one of the four invasion of privacy torts.45 The
Restatement text establishes liability for the publication of the private
life of another, provided the publicized matter is highly offensive to a
reasonable person and is not a matter of legitimate public concern." To
assist in determining whether a matter is of legitimate public concern,
the Restatement offers as examples such traditional events as details of
"homicide and other crimes, arrests, police raids, suicides, marriages and
divorces, accidents, fires, catastrophes of nature, a death from the use of
narcotics, [and] a rare disease," as well as less traditional events such as
"the birth of a child to a twelve-year-old girl, the reappearance of one
supposed to have been murdered years ago, a report... concerning the
escape of a wild animal and many other similar matters of genuine, even
if more or less deplorable, popular appeal."47 However, the Restatement
draws the line "when the publicity ceases to be the giving of information
to which the public is entitled, and becomes a morbid and sensational
prying into private lives for its own sake, with which a reasonable
member of the public, with decent standards, would say that he had no
concern."'48 If the volumes of case law are any indication, determination
of where that line is drawn is still in dispute today. 9
The private facts tort is recognized as common law in thirty-nine
states and the District of Columbia." The most recent jurisdiction to
time. There need be no 'reattraction' of the public eye because the public
interest never wavered. An individual whose name is fixed in the public's
memory, such as that of the political assassin, never becomes an anonymous
member of the community again. But in each case it is for the trier of fact to
determine whether the individual's infamy is such that he has never left the
public arena; we cannot do so as a matter of law.
Id. at 40.
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 652D (1977).
46. See id.
47. Id. § 652D cmt. g.
48. Id. § 652D cmt. h.
49. For a detailed discussion of the confusion in current case law, see infra Part
III.B.
50. See Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, 492 A.2d 580, 587 (D.C. 1985); Johnston v.
Fuller, 706 So. 2d 700, 701 (Ala. 1997); Smith v. Suratt, 7 Alaska 416, 423-26 (D.
Alaska 1926) (recognizing the tort but finding photographs complained of to be a matter
of public interest); Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 783 P.2d 781, 784 (Ariz.
1989); Milam v. Bank of Cabot, 937 S.W.2d 653, 657 (Ark. 1997); Shulman v. Group W
Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 478 (Cal. 1998); Ozer v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 377 (Colo.
1997); Department of Children & Families v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 710 A.2d 1378,
1381 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998); Barker v. Huang, 610 A.2d 1341, 1349 (Del. 1992); Doe v.
Univision Television Group, Inc., 717 So. 2d 63, 64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998);
Multimedia WMAZ v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491, 493 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); State of Haw.
Org. of Police Officers (SHOPO) v. Society of Prof I Journalists-Univ. of Haw. Chapter,
927 P.2d 386, 406 (Haw. 1996); Baker v. Burlington N., Inc., 587 P.2d 829, 832 (Idaho
1978); Green v. Chicago Tribune Co., 675 N.E.2d 249, 252 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); Howard
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recognize the tort is Minnesota, which overturned previous case law in
1998. 5' Additionally, two states have suggested they would entertain the
private facts tort in the proper factual scenario' 2 The tort has also been
codified in three states not previously recognizing a common law right,53
bringing the total to forty-five jurisdictions that recognize or would
recognize the private facts tort. Most of the courts follow the elements
outlined in the Restatement, requiring a public disclosure of private facts
which are both highly offensive to a reasonable person and not of
legitimate public concern.'However, as will be discussed in Part III, there is no universal
v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289, 291 (Iowa 1979); Werner v.
Kliewer, 710 P.2d 1250, 1256 (Kan. 1985); Pearce v. Courier-Journal, 683 S.W.2d 633,
637 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985); Roshto v. Hebert, 439 So. 2d 428, 430 (La. 1983); Nelson v.
Maine Times, 373 A.2d 1221, 1223 (Me. 1977); Lawrence v. A.S. Abell Co., 475 A.2d
448, 450-51 (Md. 1984); Winstead v. Sweeney, 517 N.W.2d 874, 875-76 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1994); Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998); Young
v. Jackson, 572 So. 2d 378, 381-82 (Miss. 1990); Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp., 795 S.W.2d 488,
498 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); State Bd. of Dentistry v. Kandarian, 886 P.2d 954, 957 (Mont.
1994); Montesano v. Donrey Media Group, 668 P.2d 1081, 1084 (Nev. 1983); Romaine
v. Kallinger, 537 A.2d 284, 291-92 (N.J. 1988); McNutt v. New Mexico State Tribune
Co., 538 P.2d 804, 807-08 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975); Bertsch v. Communications Workers
of Am., Local 4302, 655 N.E.2d 243, 247 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); Guinn v. Church of
Christ, 775 P.2d 766, 781-82 (Okla. 1989); Flowers v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say.
Ass'n, 679 P.2d 1385, 1389 (Or. Ct. App. 1984); Culver v. Port Allegany Reporter
Argus, 598 A.2d 54, 56 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm
Credit, ACA, 483 S.E.2d 789, 793-94 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997); Montgomery Ward v.
Shope, 286 N.W.2d 806, 808 n.1 (S.D. 1979); Major v. Charter Lakeside Hosp., Inc.,
1990 WL 125538, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug 31, 1990); Hogan v. Hearst Corp., 945
S.W.2d 246, 250 (Tex. App. 1997); Stien v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., 944 P.2d
374, 380 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Lemnah v. American Breeders Serv., Inc., 482 A.2d 700,
703-04 & n.1 (Vt. 1984) (applying RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) to
the facts of the case without addressing the more general issue of what constituted the
elements of the invasion of privacy tort in Vermont); Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d
333, 339 (Wash. 1998); Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 85 (W. Va.
1984).
, 51. See Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998). In
justifying their decision, the court wrote, "[tioday we join the majority of jurisdictions
and recognize the tort of invasion of privacy. The right to privacy is an integral part of
our humanity... [t]he heart of our liberty is choosing which parts of our lives shall
become public and which parts we shall hold close." Id.
52. See Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239, 240-41 (N.H. 1964) (discussing the
private facts tort in an intrusion action); Hougum v. Valley Mem'l Homes, 574 N.W.2d
812, 816 n.1 (N.D. 1998) (hinting that they might recognize the private facts tort had the
plaintiff included it as a cause of action).
53. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 214, § lB (West 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-
28.1 (1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.50 (West 1997).
54. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 50.
standard for determining what is of legitimate public concern, as many
different tests exist for evaluating newsworthiness." Therefore, it is
impossible to understand the tort without grappling with the vague term
of newsworthiness and its potential First Amendment conflict.
III. CONFLICT wiTH FREEDOM OF SPEECH:
THE BEGINNING OF THE END
A. The Supreme Court's Limited Treatment of the Private Facts
Newsworthiness Defense
Even before the private facts tort was recognized by the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, it had been challenged on constitutional grounds. 6
As with any cause of action that might restrict speech, it was inevitable
that the private facts tort would clash with the First Amendment.
However, despite claims to the contrary,57 no real winner has emerged
from the several private facts bouts entertained by the Supreme Court.
To the contrary, the Supreme Court's limited handling of the First
Amendment conflict has made the private facts tort "a mess."58
The first constitutional challenge addressed by the Supreme Court was
in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,9 a case involving the television
identification of the name of a brutally murdered rape victim.6 In Cox,
the victim's father sued the owner of a television station, claiming that
the newscast violated a Georgia statute making the broadcast of a rape
victim's identity a misdemeanor. The television station responded that
since the rape victim's name was taken from court indictments involving
the alleged murderers, it was constitutionally protected under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. The Georgia Supreme Court rejected the
media station's arguments, holding that the plaintiff had a right to trial
under common law invasion of privacy.
In Cox, the Supreme Court overturned the decision of the Georgia
Supreme Court.62 In his opinion, Justice White acknowledged the need
55. See infra Part III.B.
56. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (declaring a Georgia
statute punishing the publication of a rape victim's publicly available identity
unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds).
57. See, e.g., Van Wey, supra note 13, at 300 (claiming that the Supreme Court's
decision in Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989), rendered the private facts tort
extinct).
58. Elford, supra note 13, at 727.
59. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
60. See id. at 471-74.
61. See id. at 474-75.
62. See id. at 476.
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for the right to privacy but noted that the private facts tort "most directly
confront[s] the constitutional freedoms of speech and press." 3 However,
his decision was far from sweeping. In finding for the television station,
the court carefully and repeatedly limited the decision to the narrow
issue of whether a state may punish the accurate publication of a rape
victim's identity obtained from judicial documents that are open to
public inspection.64 Additionally, it expressly declined to address the
broader question of whether the publication of truthful information could
ever be punished.65
A careful analysis of the Cox decision quickly reveals that, due to its
limited holding, it does not provide any practical guidelines for
determining when a matter is newsworthy. In fact, by declaring only
that liability cannot be attached to the disclosure of information from
judicial documents of public record, the case simply reaffirms the
private facts tort element that the disclosure must contain private, instead
of public, facts.' In other words, since the matter was already public,
63. Id. at 489.
64. Justice White wrote:
Rather than address the broader question whether truthful publications may
ever be subjected to civil or criminal liability consistently with the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, or to put it another way, whether the State may ever
define and protect an area of privacy free from unwanted publicity in the press,
it is appropriate to focus on the narrower interface between press and privacy
that this case presents, namely, whether the State may iipose sanctions on the
accurate publication of the name of a rape victim obtained from public
records-more specifically, from judicial records which are maintained in
connection with a public prosecution and which themselves are open to public
inspection. We are convinced that the State may not do so.
Id. at 491. The court repeatedly stressed the limitations of its holding throughout the
decision. "[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments command nothing less than that the
States may not impose sanctions on the publication of truthful information contained in
official court records open to public inspection." Id. at 495. "Once true information is
disclosed in public court documents open to public inspection, the press cannot be
sanctioned for publishing it." Id. at 496.
65. In discussing this issue, the court wrote:
Appellants have contended that whether they derived the information in
question from public records or instead through their own investigation, the
First and Fourteenth Amendments bar any sanctions from being imposed by
the State because of the publication. Because appellants have prevailed on
more limited grounds, we need not address this broader challenge to the
validity of... Georgia's right of action for public disclosure.
Id. at 497 n.27.
66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 652D cmt. b (1977). "There is no
liability when the defendant merely gives further publicity to information about the
plaintiff that is already public. Thus there is no liability for.., matters of public
record." Id. The Cox decision is also consistent with Warren's and Brandeis' original
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the question of newsworthiness was irrelevant, because plaintiff failed to
state a cause of action for disclosure of private facts. 7 Therefore, the
question of what constituted newsworthiness was postponed until
another day.
The most recent Supreme Court opinion touching upon the private
facts question is Florida Star v. B.J.F.,68 which some have declared to
severely undercut the private facts tort.69 In Florida Star, a newspaper
published the name of a rape victim after receiving the information from
a police department press release.' Following publication, the plaintiff's
mother received threatening phone calls from an individual threatening
to rape the plaintiff again, causing the plaintiff to change her address and
phone number, and to seek mental health counseling. As a result, the
plaintiff filed a negligence per se lawsuit against the newspaper and the
police department under a Florida statute banning the publication of the
names of sexual offense victims. 71 In its appeal to the Supreme Court,
the newspaper asserted that the case was identical to the situation in Cox;
the newspaper also alleged that previous Supreme Court decisions
suggested a broad rule that the press could never be liable for publishing
truthful information.
72
In another narrow ruling limited to the facts at hand, the Supreme
Court invoked the First Amendment to reach a finding of no liability for
the newspaper.73 Similar to previous cases, the Court emphasized that it
was "relying on limited principles that sweep no more broadly than the
appropriate context of the instant case."'74 Although the Court provided
three reasons justifying its decision, the case was primarily decided on
the basis that the State could not punish the media for disclosing
information which came from the State itself.75 If the media were
article, which declared that court publications should be privileged. See Warren &
Brandeis, supra note 4, at 216.
67. Justice White stated, "[a]ppellee has hot contended that the name was obtained
in an improper fashion or that it was not on an official court document open to public
inspection." Cox, 420 U.S. at 496.
68. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
69. See id. at 550-52 (White, J., Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, I., dissenting). See
also Van Wey, supra note 13, at 312 (concluding that the Florida Star decision may
signal the end for the private facts tort).
70. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 527.
71. See id. at 526-28.
72. See id. at 531.
73. See id. at 532.
74. Id. at 533.
75. See id. at 538. The other two reasons were not closely related to the question
of newsworthiness. First, the Court criticized the broad reach of the Florida statute
because, unlike the Restatement (Second) of Torts, there was no requirement that the
disclosed information be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Second, the statute
appeared to hold mass media to a higher standard than small distributors of information.
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
required to evaluate government-provided news releases to determine
the potential newsworthiness of that information, self-censorship would
surely result. 76 The court also reasoned that because the government
released the information, that action implied that it was proper and
expected to be further disseminated."
However, despite some scholarly opinion to the contrary,78 Florida
Star can hardly be seen as the final blow to the private facts tort.
Although the Court found for the defendant newspaper, it expressly
rejected the newspaper's broad claim that the press could never be held
liable for publishing the truth.79  Further, in specifically rejecting the
request for a broad ruling protecting the publication of all truthful
information, Justice Marshall stated that "[o]ur cases have carefully
eschewed reaching this ultimate question, mindful that the future may
bring scenarios which prudence counsels our not resolving
anticipatory."8 Additionally, the court did not rule out that there might
be factual situations warranting punishing the media for publishing the
identity of a rape victim.8
In view of the narrowness of the holding, it is difficult to extract a
coherent message from the Florida Star decision. To further complicate
matters, Justice White, the author of the Court's decision in Cox,
dissented with the majority on several grounds.2 However, it appears
See id. at 539-41.
76. See id. at 538.
77. See id. However, the decision glossed over two important facts. Not only did
the newspaper violate its own internal policy by revealing the name of rape victims, the
room containing the police report contained signs clearly stating that the identities of
rape victims were not a matter of public record and were not allowed to be published.
See id. at 546 (White, J., Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, J., dissenting).
78. See id. at 550-52 (White, J., Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, J., dissenting). See
also Van Wey, supra note 13, at 312 (concluding that the Florida Star decision may
signal the end for the private facts tort).
79. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 532. The court "conclude[d] that imposing
damages on appellant for publishing B.J.F.'s name violates the First Amendment,
although not for... the reasons appellant urges." Id.
80. Id.
81. Justice Marshall wrote:
Our holding today is limited. We do not hold that truthful publication is
automatically constitutionally protected, or that there is no zone of personal
privacy within which the State may protect the individual from intrusion by the
press, or even that a State may never punish publication of the name of a
victim of a sexual offense.
Id. at 541.
82. Justice White argued that, unlike Cox, the information was not already part of
the public record. In addition, according to White, the decision promoted irresponsible
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that the case expands the definition of newsworthiness by denying
liability in situations where the information is provided by the
government. But, beyond that specific context, the Court made no
attempt to provide a standard for lower courts to use in defining
newsworthiness consistent with the First Amendment. By passing over
such an opportunity, the Court opened the door for subsequent years of
inconsistent case law.
B. Picking Up Where Florida Star Left Off.- Attempts by Courts to Deal
with Questions Unresolved by the Supreme Court
In the absence of a broad Supreme Court ruling on the conflict
between the private facts tort and the First Amendment, the state and
lower federal courts have been left to themselves to distinguish between
legitimate publicity and unwarranted invasions of privacy. As a result,
five different major tests have emerged to determine if the disclosed
private facts merit the newsworthiness defense.
3
1. Restatement Approach
Given the predominance of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in the
acceptance of the private facts tort, it is appropriate to begin with an
evaluation of the Restatement's newsworthiness test. Not surprisingly,
the Restatement contains the most commonly relied-upon
newsworthiness test." However, the American Law Institute's approach
to determining whether private facts are of legitimate public concern
might also be the most complicated newsworthiness test.8" The
Restatement relies upon the public's customs and conventions, which
are heavily weighted towards community mores.86 This standard, first
journalism, which may be worse than limiting freedom of the press. Finally, the decision
leaves victims of inadvertently released information without legal recourse. See id. at
542-53 (White, J., Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, J., dissenting). However, the third
argument seems to ignore that victims in such circumstances have legal recourse against
the organization releasing the information to the press. See Doe v. City of New York, 15
F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1994) (allowing plaintiff to sue the city for disclosing his HIV status in
a news release).
83. See Dendy, supra note 10, at 157-64. Dendy concluded that court jurisdictions
have developed five separate tests for evaluating newsworthiness, falling along a
continuum between absolute immunity from liability and absolute censorship. His tests,
which are discussed in detail in this section (but in different order), include: complete
rejection of the private facts tort; the "Leave It to the Press Model;" the Virgil v. Time,
Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975) and Restatement approach; the Nexus test; and the
California approach. See Dendy, supra note 10, at 157-64.
84. See Dendy, supra note 10, at 160-61.
85. See id.
86. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (1977).
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adopted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Virgil v. Time, Inc.,'
denies liability when the private facts revealed are of legitimate public
concern.88 However, when the publicity exceeds the community's sense
of decency, it no longer can be claimed to be of legitimate public
concern. Put another way, if a reasonable person would find the
disclosed facts so indecent as to exceed the promulgation of information
to which the community is entitled, then that disclosure is not of
legitimate public concern.
This approach attempts to balance an individual's right to privacy
while maintaining freedom of the press. The Virgil court believed that
judicial scrutiny of the Restatement's community mores test was capable
of protecting privacy rights consistent with the First Amendment. 0
However, this approach has also been criticized by commentators as
unworkable, mainly due to its reliance on a subjective determination of
what private facts disclosures violate community mores.9' Yet despite
the persuasive arguments of critics, the Restatement's approach has
received favorable consideration in subsequent decisions outside the
Ninth Circuit, particularly in recent years.-
2. Refusal to Recognize the Private Facts Tort
A handful of jurisdictions contrast the Restatement's newsworthiness
approach by expressly rejecting the private facts tort.93 Thus, any true
87. 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975); Dendy, supra note 10, at 160-61.
88. See Virgil at 1129; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFToRTS § 652D cmt. h (1977).
89. See Virgil at 1129; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFTORTS § 652D cmt. h (1977).
90. See Virgil at 1130; see also Dendy, supra note 10, at 164-66 (advocating that
the Restatement's decency limitation on newsworthiness protects privacy consistent with
other Supreme Court limitations on expression, such as obscenity).
91. See Zimmerman, supra note 12, at 359-62. Professor Zimmerman argues that
courts may be unable to develop a general consensus as to what private facts will exceed
the Restatement's definition of newsworthiness, leading to unpredictable verdicts.
When we weigh the continued chilling effect of potential litigation and
unpredictable liability against the benefits of allowing courts to retain the
option of remedying some rare, genuinely offensive bits of publicity, we must
question whether the preservation of even a small comer of the Warren-
Brandeis tort is worth the risks. This observer answers in the negative.
Id. at 362.
92. See Ozer v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 378 (Colo. 1997) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 D cmt. h (1977)); Green v. Chicago Tribune Co., 675 N.E.2d
249, 256 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h
(1977)); Winstead v. Sweeney, 517 N.W.2d 874, 877 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFToRTS § 652D cmt. h (1977)).
93. Four jurisdictions have rejected the tort. See Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690
disclosure of private facts is immune from liability. One of the
jurisdictions justified this position by relying on the Supreme Court's
statement in Cox that private facts tort liability for true but non-
newsworthy facts directly challenges freedom of the press.
This approach places constitutionally protected freedom of speech and
press above an individual's right to privacy. By refusing to recognize
the tort, it also implies that all true facts, no matter how private, are of
legitimate public concern. However, only two jurisdictions since Cox
have adopted this approach.95 Even Judge Posner was not willing to go
this far in Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.,96 a case that was critical of the
private facts tort.' Although that case found for the defendant, Judge
Posner acknowledged that the private facts tort survived the Supreme
Court's decisions in Cox and Florida Star.98  Therefore, the
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that have not employed this
approach must believe that the private facts tort can co-exist with the
First Amendment.
N.E.2d 681, 682 (Ind. 1997); Howell v. N.Y. Post Co., Inc., 612 N.E. 2d 699, 702 (N.Y.
1993); Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 73 N.W.2d 803 (Neb. 1955) superseded by statute
on other grounds by NEB. REv. STAT. § 20-201 (1997) (codifying the intrusion, false
light and commercial appropriation torts but not the private facts tort); Hall v. Post, 372
S.E.2d 711, 717 (N.C. 1988). Additionally, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has
held, in the absence of Virginia Supreme Court guidance, that no right of privacy exists
beyond a limited commercial appropriation statute. See Brown v. American Broad. Co.,
Inc., 704 F.2d 1296 (4th Cir. 1983).
94. See Hall, 372 S.E.2d at 717.
95. The jurisdictions are Indiana and North Carolina. See Methodist, 690 N.E. 2d
at 685; Hall, 372 S.E.2d at 717. However, even Hall may not be as critical of the private
facts concept as it initially appears. In justifying its refusal to recognize the tort, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina also claimed that the private facts tort overlapped with
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
[Un almost every instance in which a North Carolina plaintiff could establish a
claim under the private facts tort, the same plaintiff could more easily establish
a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Since plaintiffs will
only be entitled to recover once, if at all, it would seem the recognition of the
private facts tort by this [c]ourt would deliver nothing of any real value.
Hall, 372 S.E.2d at 716-17. Thus, the Hall decision is far from a complete rejection of
invasion of privacy. If potential private facts victims are able to pursue redress in North
Carolina under intentional infliction of emotional distress, then the private facts tort is
recognized in spirit if not by name.
96. 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993).
97. See id. at 1231 (criticizing past private facts cases with victorious plaintiffs as
being out of step with the proper balance between privacy and First Amendment rights).
98. Justice Posner wrote:
We do not think the Court was being coy in Cox or Florida Star in declining to
declare the tort of publicizing intensely personal facts totally defunct.
Id. at 1232.
504
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3. "Leave-it-to-the-Press Model"
An ostensibly less extreme approach to defining newsworthiness is an
approach that Professor Diane Zimmerman has labeled the "leave-it-to-
the press model."" This approach (theoretically) recognizes the private
facts tort, but defers the definition of newsworthiness to the press, not to
the courts.1" As a result, anything printed by the media is by definition
newsworthy.'"' Today, this discretionary approach is only recognized in
one jurisdiction."°
The primary advocate of this approach believes the press is better
suited than the legal system to define what constitutes a matter of
legitimate public concern. ' 3 Professor Zimmerman argues that market
forces will regulate what the media provides the public, and that
"audience and advertiser response is more likely to restrain
publishers... than the uncertain threat of an award of damages."'' ° She
further stated that any attempt beyond market regulation would only
amount to an artificial judicially biased judgment on what type of
information the public desires."
However, this argument may be fundamentally flawed in its
assumption that the media will give the audience only what it wants.
Today's media must cater not only to the American audience, but also to
corporate advertisers and a much larger global audience. Thus, the news
Americans see is influenced by the mores of commercial sponsors and
by the viewing desires of other countries. 6 The result of these
influences may be an emphasis on inexpensive and sensational stories
99. Zimmerman, supra note 12, at 353; Dendy, supra note 10, at 159.
100. See Zimmerman, supra note 12, at 353-54.
101. See id. at 353.
102. See Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289, 302
(Iowa 1979); cf. Dendy, supra note 10, at 159 n.86. At the time of Dendy's Note,
Minnesota may have also followed the "leave-it-to-the-press" approach, but the
Minnesota Supreme Court overturned previous case law in 1998 by allowing a private
facts case to proceed forward. See Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 234-
35 (Minn. 1998). Although the case was not against a media defendant, nothing in the
court's opinion suggested they would follow the "leave-it-to-the-press" approach in
evaluating newsworthiness. See Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 233-35.
103. See Zimmerman, supra note 12, at 353.
104. Id. at 354.
105. See id.
106. For a detailed discussion on the "externalities" which affect media coverage of
current events, see C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 Om o ST.
L.J. 311 (1997).
that are tantalizing to broad audiences.' 7 Unfortunately, many of
today's television talk shows and print tabloids clearly support the
theory that self-regulation does not prevent the disclosure of highly
offensive "private facts" of marginal to no public interest.' 3 For
example, the circular "leave-it-to-the-press" argument provides shows
such as Jerry Springer°9 free rein to explore any intrusive and titillating
topic that will grab sensational ratings, regardless of its apparent
intrusiveness upon privacy."0 Therefore, although the "leave-it-to-the-
press" model honors the private facts tort in theory, in reality, its
absolute deference to the media renders the private facts tort
meaningless against media defendants."'
4. The (now defunct?) California Three-Prong Approach
A different and unique approach to defining newsworthiness has
emerged out of California common law. In Kapellas v. Koffinan,H2 the
California Supreme Court promulgated its own test for evaluating
newsworthiness." 3 In that case, the children of a candidate for public
office brought suit against a newspaper when it revealed in an editorial
that they had been arrested for juvenile offenses."4 In finding for the
newspaper defendant, the court set forth a three-prong test that
considered 1) the social use of the published facts; 2) the extent of the
107. See id. at 357-58 (declaring that the importance of market ratings forces
contemporary journalists to focus on inexpensive and tantalizing stories as opposed to
expensive traditional journalism).
108. Perhaps the failure of the "leave-it-to-the-press" model to regulate the
disclosure of non-newsworthy private facts has led to the recent judicial backlash against
media defendants in cases where it appears the media stepped over the line. See infra
Part LV.C.
109. The Jerry Springer show is a controversial daytime television talk show that
routinely explores what are arguably highly offensive issues of little legitimate public
concern. Samples of show topics for a one week period include Attack of the Ex-Lovers,
Viewers Battle the Klan, I Have Another Lover, and I Have a Wild Sex Job. See David
Bauder, Jerry Springer Promises to Tone Things Down, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 3,
1998.
110. The problem with shows such as Jerry Springer is not that the guests are
revealing intimate personal facts about themselves, but that they reveal embarrassing
personal facts about their close relatives and friends in the process, without their
consent. For a detailed discussion of how the private facts tort can be used against
tabloid television, see infra Part IV.E.3. See also Robin Famoso, Note, Ambush TV:
Holding Talk Shows Liable for the Public Disclosure of Private Facts, 29 RUTGERs L.J.
579 (1998); Eduardo W. Gonzales, Comment, "Get That Camera Out of My Face!" An
Examination of the Viability of Suing "Tabloid Television" for Invasion of Privacy," 51
U. MIAMI L. REV 935 (1997).
111. See Dendy, supra note 10, at 160.
112. 459 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1969).
113. See id. at 922.
114. See id. at 914-15.
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article's encroachment into seemingly private affairs; and, 3) the extent
to which the victim consented to a position of public fame."'
Additionally, in Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n,"6 the California
Supreme Court added an additional "decency" limitation, meaning that
one could be liable even for publication of newsworthy private facts if
the publisher acted "with reckless disregard for the fact that reasonable
men would find the invasion highly offensive.""1
7
Like the Restatement, the California approach attempts to balance
privacy interests with the First Amendment. The California Supreme
Court in all subsequent private facts cases has cited the Kapellas three-
prong balancing test with approval."8 However, although the court still
cited Kapellas favorably in its most recent private facts decision,"9 the
court's reconciliation of the test with the "logical nexus" approach may
render the three-prong test extinct.'2
5. The "Logical Nexus" Approach
If case law is any guide, the fastest growing approach to defining
newsworthiness is the "logical nexus" approach.'2' This approach, first
developed in Campbell v. Seabury Press,'22 invokes the newsworthiness
defense when there is a logical relationship between the plaintiff and a
matter of legitimate public concern."z In Campbell, the former sister-in-
law of a civil rights leader sued the author and publisher of an
autobiography that disclosed embarrassing private facts about her
previous marriage." In finding for the defendant, the Fifth Circuit held
that since the facts of the plaintiffs marriage impacted the
autobiography's author, the revealed facts "ha[d] the requisite logical
115. See id. at 922.
116. 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971).
117. Id. at44.
118. See Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 482 (Cal. 1998); Forsher
v. Bugliosi, 608 P.2d 716, 726 (Cal. 1980); Briscoe, 483 P. 2d at 43.
119. See Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P. 2d 469,482 (Cal. 1998).
120. See id. at 502 (Brown & Baxter, JJ., concurring and dissenting). For a more
detailed discussion of the challenges created by the Shulman decision, see infra notes
305-323 and accompanying text.
121. See Dendy, supra note 10, at 162. The "logical nexus" concept has been called
by several names. These include "substantial relevance," "substantially related," and
facts "germane" to story. See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 484-85.
122. 614 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980).
123. See id. at 397.
124. See id. at 396.
nexus to fall within the ambit of constitutional protection."'' 8
Since the Campbell decision, at least six other jurisdictions have
adopted the "logical nexus" approach to defining newsworthiness. 2
Like the Restatement and Kapellas tests, the "logical nexus" approach
attempts to balance an individual's privacy interests with the First
Amendment. Supporters of the approach believe that it meets the
Restatement's goal "that legitimate public interest does not include 'a
morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake."" 7
However, critics of this approach advocate that since most people are
involved with some activity of concern, their entire lives could become
subject to public view."
C. Scholarly Response to the Courts' Approaches to Newsworthiness
As expected, legal scholars have varying views on the current state of
the private facts tort. However, the prevailing view of recent literature is
that the newsworthiness defense is "so overpowering as virtually to
swallow the tort."'2 Likewise, no less that seven law review articles in
125. Id. at 397.
126. See Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1233 (7th Cir. 1993)
(holding that details of plaintiff's marriage that appeared in a social history novel were"germane" to a story of legitimate public interest); Gilbert v. Medical Econ. Co., 665
F.2d 305, 309 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding that physician's identity, photograph, and
marital and psychiatric problems were "substantially relevant" to the newsworthy topic
of medical malpractice); Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, 492 A.2d 580, 590 (D.C. 1985)
(holding that no "logical nexus" existed between plaintiff's plastic surgery pictures and
her doctor's promotional program) (citation omitted); Shulman v. Group W Prods., 955
P.2d 469, 488 (Cal. 1998) (holding that a broadcast video and its accompanying audio
feed depicting an automobile accident victim's non-graphic, injured and disoriented state
were "substantially relevant" to a news special on emergency care workers); Ozer v.
Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 378 (Colo. 1997) (requiring "substantial relevance" to a matter
of legitimate public concern) (quoting Gilbert, 665 F.2d at 308); Ayash v. Dana Farber
Cancer Inst., No. CIV.A. 96-0565-E, 1997 WL 438769, at *6 (Mass. Super. July 9,
1997) (holding that newspaper article discussing hospital's internal investigation against
physician after a patient died from a drug overdose was "closely related" to matter of
public concern). Additionally, four years prior to the Campbell decision, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of California advocated a similar test to the
"logical nexus" approach. See Virgil v. Sports Illustrated, 424 F. Supp. 1286, 1289 n.2
(S.D. Cal. 1976) (holding that body surfer's radical habits were "at least arguably
close[ly] relat[ed]" to a legitimate journalistic article on bodysurfing).
127. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 485 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D
cmt. h (1977)).
128. See, e.g., Winstead v. Sweeney, 517 N.W.2d 874, 878 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
Most persons are connected with some activity.., as to which the public can
be said as a matter of law to have a legitimate interest or curiosity. To hold as
a matter of law that private facts as to such persons are also within the area of
legitimate public interest could indirectly expose everyone's private life to
public view.
Id. (quoting Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 1975).
129. Zimmerman, supra note 12, at 351 (quoting Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort
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the last fifteen years have declared the tort to be ineffective or on the
verge of collapse. 3'
Indeed, it can be argued that the broad reach applied to the
newsworthiness defense has greatly exceeded the defense's theoretical
scope.31  Despite the five different tests used in evaluating
newsworthiness, plaintiffs rarely succeeded under the private facts tort.32
Justices were quick to point out their reluctance in editing the press. 33
First Amendment advocates were also quick to endorse such a broad
approach to prevent judicial editing of the press."M By contrast,
supporters of the private facts tort proposed limiting the scope of the
newsworthiness defense.
However, what is absent from the scholarly commentary is the
recognition of a quiet judicial movement in progress. While the
commentators are busy arguing the merits and shortfalls of the private
facts tort and announcing its demise, there have been a growing number
of cases finding for plaintiffs in recent years.36 In fact, as will be
discussed in Part IV, the Warren and Brandeis tort may not only have
Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CoNTEW. PROBS. 326, 336
(1966)).
130. See C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHmo ST. L.J.
311, 380 (1997) (declaring the private facts tort as having "little if any actual bite");
DeLaTorre, supra note 13, at 1184 (calling the private facts tort a "phantom tort");
Jeanne M. Hauch, Protecting Private Facts in France: The Warren & Brandeis Tort Is
Alive and Well and Flourishing in Paris, 68 TuL. L. REv. 1219, 1221 (1994) (stating that
the private facts tort is "languishing on the vine" in the United States); Lyrissa Barnett
Lidsky, Prying, Spying, and Lying: Intrusive Newsgathering and What the Law Should
Do About It, 73 TutL L. REv. 173, 198 (1998) (declaring that the private facts tort "is not
a viable weapon against media intrusions"); Dendy, supra note 10, at 148 (calling the
tort "effectively impotent"); Elford, supra note 13, at 729 (proposing that the private
facts tort is "on the verge of collapsing under the weight of the First Amendment"); Van
Wey, supra note 13, at 300 (claiming that the Supreme Court's decision in Florida Star
rendered the private facts tort extinct).
131. See Dendy, supra note 10, at 163 (advocating that the newsworthiness defense
has grown beyond a simple judicial check on the tort's breadth to become an
insurmountable hurdle because of censorship fears).
132. A pre-1983 survey of state law found less than eighteen cases where plaintiffs
either received an award for damages or survived a motion for summary judgment or
dismissal. See Zimmerman, supra note 12, at 293 n.5.
133. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Medical Econ. Co., 665 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1981)
(declaring that the press required breathing space to "properly exercise effective editorial
judgment").
134. See Zimmerman, supra note 12, at 354.
135. See Elford, supra note 13, at 743-50 (recommending abolishing the
newsworthiness defense and replacing it with a rights-based approach).
136. See discussion infra Part IV.
found a path around the newsworthiness hurdle, but is actually subtly
flourishing in courtrooms across America.
IV. THE RESURRECTION OF THE TORT:
LIMmNG THE DEFINITION OF NEWSWORTHINESS
In the first ninety years after the Warren and Brandeis article,
plaintiffs were rarely successful in bringing private facts claims.'37 As
discussed previously, pro-defendant decisions in cases such as Florida
Star were generally thought to foreshadow the end of the private facts
tort.138 To the contrary, in the last five and one-half years, plaintiffs have
been more successful than ever before in bringing a private facts
claim.'39 This section will examine these cases in detail and will suggest
some rationales for the subtle reemergence of the private facts tort.
A. Protecting Confidential Medical Information
One of the most effective applications of the private facts tort in recent
years has been remedying the unauthorized disclosure of confidential
medical information. Victorious plaintiffs in these cases have
successfully used the tort to recover damages following the disclosure of
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) infection,'" graphic autopsy
pictures, 4' plastic surgery, 42 Hepatitis C condition,' and other private
medical information.'" Defendants in these cases include traditional
media and government defendants, as well as non-traditional private
facts defendants such as employers, universities and medical
laboratories.
In Multimedia WMAZ v. Kubach,145 a patient with Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) sued a television station after his
137. See supra note 132.
138. See Van Wey, supra note 13, at 300 (claiming that the Supreme Court's
decision in Florida Star rendered the private facts tort extinct).
139. In a survey of case law since 1993, this author discovered at least twenty-one
cases where plaintiffs were awarded damages or survived a motion for summary
judgment or dismissal, including one in 1999 and 10 in 1998. See cases cited infra Part
IV.A-D.
140. See Doe v. High-Tech Inst., Inc., 972 P.2d 1060 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998);
Multimedia WMAZ v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
141. See Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333 (Wash. 1998).
142. See Conway v. Cook County, No. 98 C 5324, 1999 WL 14497 (N.D. 111. Jan. 8,
1999); Doe v. Univision Television Group, Inc., 717 So. 2d 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
143. See Marino v. Arandell Corp., 1 F. Supp. 2d 947 (E.D. Wis. 1998).
144. See Blackwell v. Harris Chem. N. Am., Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (D. Kan.
1998).
145. 443 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
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identifiable image was mistakenly broadcast for seven seconds during a
broadcast on AIDS.'46 The AIDS patient had previously consented to
participate in the television show provided his identity would be
concealed. The television station argued on appeal that the inadvertent
disclosure was immune from liability because it occurred during a show
that had legitimate public interest. The court did not agree and upheld
the plaintiff's jury verdict on the basis that the identities of AIDS
victims are not of legitimate public concern.
In a similar case, Doe v. High-Tech Institute, Inc.,14 a student filed suit
against her college and a drug test laboratory after the positive results of
a non-consented HIV test were sent to the Colorado Department of
Health and other third parties.'49 The plaintiff settled out of court with
the laboratory, but the college was found liable under the private facts
tort.' Although the case was appealed, the private facts liability was
not contested.'
Confidential medical information liability has extended beyond HIV
infection. In Reid v. Pierce County,5 2 four different families sued the
county medical examiner's office in separate actions after it was
discovered that office employees obtained and displayed graphic autopsy
pictures of the families' dead relatives at cocktail parties, school classes
and in personal scrapbooks. Prior to consolidation of the cases, each
of the cases had been dismissed in lower courts.' 4 The Washington
146. See id. at 493.
147. See id. at 494-95. In justifying why the revelation was not newsworthy, the
court relied upon a related state statute restricting the disclosure of persons being treated
for AIDS. Since the state criminally punished the unauthorized disclosure of such
information, the court logically concluded that the identities of AIDS victims were not of
legitimate public interest. See id.
148. 972 P.2d 1060 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).
149. See id. at 1064.
150. See id.
151. The issue on appeal was whether plaintiff's recovery under the private facts
tort precluded a second claim for intrusion upon seclusion. See id.
Although not a common law private facts case, Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264
(2d Cir. 1994), sheds additional light on the newsworthiness defense in HIV cases. In
Doe, an HIV infected person brought a civil rights suit against the City of New York
Commission on Human Rights after the details of a settlement agreement on his previous
discrimination complaint were revealed in a public press release. In finding for the
plaintiff, the court determined that the disclosure of the confidential settlement was a
violation of the plaintiff's privacy under a New York privacy statute. See id. at 264-68.
152. 961 P.2d 333 (Wash. 1998).
153. See id. at 335-36.
154. See id.
Supreme Court overturned the previous dismissals, holding that the
display of intimate autopsy photographs was "sufficiently egregious" to
proceed to trial.' The court also expressly overruled a previous
appellate court decision that erroneously claimed Washington did not
recognize the private facts tort.156
In Doe v. Univision Television Group, Inc., 5 a patient who underwent
a poorly performed plastic surgery sued the defendant television station,
after it inadvertently broadcast her picture in a news program on the
dangers of undergoing low cost plastic surgery overseas.' 58 As in the
factual scenario in Multimedia, the plaintiff agreed to be interviewed
provided her identity and voice would be disguised.159 However, the
special effects failed, causing her identity to be immediately
recognizable to family and friends.'6 ' Once again, although the court
agreed that the subject of poorly performed plastic surgery in foreign
countries was a matter of public interest, it held that the plaintiff's
identity was not. 6'
A second plastic surgery case involving a slightly different factual
situation is Conway v. Cook County. 62 In that case, a police department
employee sued the county, the department, and several individual
officers after her department director disclosed that she had undergone
breast augmentation surgery to other employees.' 6 The surgery details,
as well as other private personal information, were revealed after the
plaintiff refused to continue her three-year romantic relationship with the
director.'6' Although the trial court dismissed the suit against the county,
the department, and two of the individual officers, the judge ruled that
plaintiff's private facts case against her former director could proceed to
trial.
'6
In another decision involving a former employee, Marino v. Arandell
155. See id. at 342.
156. See id. at 339. Prior to the decision, there had been a dispute among
Washington appellate courts as to whether the Washington Supreme Court recognized
the private facts tort. Compare Caspary v. State, No. 36689-1-1, 1997 WL 103688, at *9
(Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 1997) (discussing previous Washington Supreme Court
approval of the private facts tort), with Doe v. Group Health Coop., Inc., 932 P.2d 178,
183 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that Washington did not recognize the tort),
overruled by Reid, 961 P.2d at 339 (Wash. 1998).
157. 717 So. 2d 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
158. See id. at 64.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 65.
162, No. 98 C 5324, 1999 WL 14497 (N.D. 111. Jan. 8, 1999).
163. See id. at *l-2.
164. See id. at*1.
165. See id. at *9-10.
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Corp.,'6 the plaintiff alleged that his employer illegally inquired into and
subsequently disclosed details of his chronic Hepatitis C disability to
other co-workers. 67  The corporate defendant did not deny the
allegations, but rather argued that the plaintiffs private facts statutory
claim was barred due to a state workers' compensation statute." The
trial court did not agree to such a broad reading of the workers'
compensation statute's exclusivity, and ruled that the plaintiffs private
facts claim could proceed forward.'69
In a factually similar case, Blackwell v. Harris Chemical North
America, Inc.,'7" a former manager sued her corporate employer after
details of her personal medical information were disclosed to other
employees. 7' The defendant requested that the trial court dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a claim. However, the trial court denied
the request, ruling that the alleged release of confidential medical
information by an employer to other employees sufficiently met the
necessary elements of the private facts tort. 3
B. Defending "Protected Classes"
A second application of the private facts tort in recent years has been
the safeguarding of plaintiffs belonging to politically sensitive protected
classes. Plaintiffs in these cases have successfully used the tort to
address sensitive and emotionally charged issues such as
homosexuality,'74 identification of women undergoing abortions, '75 and
sexual harassment.'76 Defendants in the cases once again include non-
traditional private facts defendants such as employers and religious
groups.
In Ozer v. Borquez 7 a homosexual attorney sued his employer law
firm for public disclosure of private facts after a partner of the firm
166. 1 F. Supp. 2d 947 (E.D. Wis. 1998).
167. See id. at 948.
168. See id.
169. See id. at 957.
170. 11 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (D. Kan. 1998).
171. See id. at 1305.
172. See id. at 1304.
173. See id. at 1309-10.
174. See Ozer v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371 (Colo. 1997); Greenwood v. Taft, 663
N.E.2d 1030 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
175. See Doe v. Mills, 536 N.W.2d 824 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
176. See Pucci v. USAIR, 940 F. Supp. 305 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
177. 940 P.2d 371 (Colo. 1997).
revealed the plaintiffs sexual orientation and possible HV infection to
other employees."' Relying on the Restatement and the reasoning in
Multimedia, the lower appellate court concluded that the attorney's
sexual conduct and possible HIV infection clearly were not of legitimate
public concern.'79 Although the Colorado Supreme Court overturned the
case on an erroneous jury instruction dealing with the public disclosure
requirement of the tort, it did not criticize the appellate court's
determination on lack of newsworthiness. 80
A second recent case involving the disclosure of homosexuality is
Greenwood v. Taft, 8' which also involved an attorney suing his former
employer. 82  In that case, the attorney alleged that his employer
circulated private information concerning his male partner to others who
had no legitimate reason to receive the information. 3 The lower court
dismissed the case for failure to state a viable claim.'" However the
appellate court, without proceeding into a newsworthiness discussion,
reversed and remanded the case on the basis that the plaintiff had
asserted enough facts to proceed to trial under the private facts tort.' 5
The recent case law safeguarding "protected classes" also reaches
beyond sexual orientation. In Doe v. Mills,'6 two women brought a
private facts action against abortion protesters who had carried signs
with the plaintiffs' names, urging the women not to undergo their
scheduled abortions at a clinic.'87 In finding for the plaintiffs the court
conceded that the topic of abortion is of legitimate public concern.'88
However, in drawing an analogy to private medical information, the
court concluded that while the general topic of abortion was of public
concern, plaintiffs' identities were not.'89
178. See id. at 374.
179. See Borquez v. Ozer, 923 P.2d 166, 172-73 (Colo. App. 1995), rev'd on other
grounds, Ozer v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371 (Colo. 1997).
180. See Ozer, 940 P.2d at 378-80.
181. 663 N.E.2d 1030 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
182. See id. at 1031.
183. See id. The private information in dispute was the attorney's listing of his
partner as a beneficiary on his company insurance and pension benefits forms. See id. at
1034.
184. See id. at 1031.
185. See id. at 1035-36.
186. 536 N.W.2d 824 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
187. See id. at 827.
183. See id. at 830.
189. See id. In discussing the interrelation between a topic of public interest and
individual identities, the court said:
The fact that [persons] engage in an activity in which the public can be said to
have a general interest does not render every aspect of their lives subject to
public disclosure. Most persons are connected with some activity... as to
which the public can be said as a matter of law to have a legitimate interest or
curiosity. To hold as a matter of law that private facts as to such persons are
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In another employer case involving alleged sexual harassment Pucci
v. USAIR, 90 a former employee alleged private facts liability as part of a
multi-suit claim against the airline. 9' Defendants requested the trial
court to dismiss the private facts and other complaints for failure to state
a viable claim.'l Although the court did not include an in-depth
discussion of the harassed employee's private facts cause of action, it
upheld the private facts claim even though it dismissed several of her
other claims.'93
C. Reining in Sensational Media Defendants
A third application of the private facts tort in recent years has been in
the successful crusade against media defendants concerning news
programs of suspect merit.' 9 Victorious plaintiffs in these cases have
used the private facts tort against news programs that arguably crossed
the line from reporting news to "a morbid and sensational prying into
private lives for its own sake."'95  Defendants in these cases include
newspapers,'96 television stations9 7 and an Internet subscription service
provider of adult entertainment."'
also within the area of legitimate public interest could indirectly expose
everyone's private life to public view.
Id. at 830 (quoting Winstead v. Sweeney, 517 N.W.2d 874, 878 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994)).
190. 940 F. Supp. 305 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
191. See id. at 307.
192. See id. at 306.
193. See id. at 310.
194. This category is not mutually exclusive of the previous confidential medical
information or protected classes categories. However, it is a separate category in that it
focuses on the status of the defendant instead of the plaintiff. In fact, cases involving
confidential medical information or protected class plaintiffs and sensational media
defendants are likely to find a more sympathetic judge or jury than any of the categories
by itself.
195. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (1977).
196. See Hood v. National Enquirer, Inc., No. B082611 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)
(visited Apr. 12, 1999) <http://www.stanford.edu/group/law/library/how/b082611.htm>
(unpublished decision); Green v. Chicago Tribune Co., 675 N.E.2d 249 (II. App. Ct.
1996); Winstead v. Sweeney, 517 N.W.2d 874 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
197. See Veilleux v. National Broad. Co., Inc., 8 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D. Me. 1998);
Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
198. See Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D.
Cal. 1998).
1. Recent Victorious Newspaper Cases
In Winstead v. Sweeney 99 a woman sued a newspaper after it printed a
story, discussing her previous mate-swapping experiences, as part of an
overall piece on unique sexual practices.' The story included the fact
that she participated in a surrogate parenting trio and was unable to have
children due to previous abortions."° The information for the piece was
provided by her former husband in response to an advertisement run by
the paper.= The newspaper was granted summary judgment in the
lower court, on the basis that the article was newsworthy as a matter of
law.'03 On appeal, the appellate court stated that although the subject of
unique love relationships was of public concern, it was a question of fact
whether the particular facts revealed about the plaintiff were of
legitimate public interest.2
In reaching its decision, the court relied upon both the Restatement's
definition of newsworthiness and the "logical nexus" approach. 205 The
Winstead court also rejected the newspaper's argument that since the
information was obtained lawfully, the First Amendment absolved it of
any liability.26 By holding the defendant newspaper liable, the decision
implicitly undermines claims regarding the broadness of the Supreme
Court's decision in Florida Star.'
199. 517 N.W.2d 874 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
200. See id. at 875.
201. See id. Although the article only referred to the parties by their first names,
plaintiff alleged that her family, friends and employer recognized her as the woman in
the article. See id.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id. at 877-78. In denying the assertion that newsworthiness was always a
matter of law, the court declared that "in certain rare cases, it is necessary to defer to the
fact-finding process to gain a result that is fair and representative of the attitudes of the
community." Id. at 877.
205. See id. at 876-79. Also, the court favorably cited California case law's three-
prong test as an additional guide. See id. at 879 n.3.
206. The court wrote:
Just because plaintiffs former husband took it upon himself to reveal the
private facts to defendants, it does not follow that defendants thereby
automatically are absolved from liability for printing that information. If such
were the case, a media defendant could publish any material it wished as long
as it received the consent of the one communicating the information. In truth,
there are clear exceptions to the First Amendment freedom of the press that
limit the right for policy reasons (i.e., obscenity, fighting words, defamatory
information). In a case such as this, defendant's privilege is limited to that
which is determined to be newsworthy.
Id. at 880 (citation omitted).
207. By holding the newspaper liable, the court's decision implicitly reaffirmed the
limited scope of the Florida Star holding, as well as the Supreme Court's rejection of an
absolute privilege for the publication of lawfully obtained truthful information.
Although the Winstead court did not discuss Florida Star in its decision, a finding of
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Shortly after the Winstead decision, tabloid journalism suffered a blow
at the hands of the California Court of Appeal. In Hood v. National
Enquirer, Inc.,2°3 the illegitimate son of celebrity Eddie Murphyw and
the child's mother sued the supermarket tabloid The National Enquirer
following an article that not only revealed the plaintiffs by name, but
also provided the details of financial support they were receiving.
210
Although the private facts claim was dismissed in the lower court, the
appellate court reversed and allowed the lawsuit to proceed.2 ' The court
reasoned that although the general details of the plaintiffs' association
with Eddie Murphy may have been newsworthy, details of their personal
finances were not newsworthy as a matter of law.212 Both the California
liability in Winstead is consistent with Florida Star because of two substantial
differences in their factual situations. First, the information received in Florida Star was
received from the government, whereas the information in Winstead was received from a
private citizen. Thus, Winstead was not a situation where the State was attempting to
punish information it had previously provided to the media. See supra notes 68-82 and
accompanying text. The second substantive difference is that in Winstead, the Detroit
News ran an advertisement to solicit the information it later tried to declare as
newsworthy. See Winstead, 517 N.W.2d at 875.. By running an advertisement for the
information, a strong argument can be made that the newspaper was actively trying to
create news, rather than passively reporting on it.
208. No. B082611 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (visited Apr. 12, 1999) <http://www.
stanford.edu/group/law/ library/how/b0826 1.htm> (unpublished decision).
209. Eddie Murphy is a popular movie actor and comedian. See id. at 2.
210. See id. at 2-4. The plaintiffs sued the newspaper under several causes of
action, including public disclosure of private facts. The specific facts revealed in the
article included:
"And he made the boy a millionaire!"; "And when Tamara found a four-
bedroom, three-bath home in Woodlands Hills, Calif., it was purchased on
March 13, 1992, in Christian's name. The 2,583 square-foot home has a three-
car garage, a concrete driveway, a slate tile roof as well as yards in the front
and back."; "Eddie also told her to start looking for a house and he would buy
it for her and Christian."; "Eddie gives her a generous allowance every month
and she's living like a queen. She did over $60,000 of remodeling in her house
and bought a new Range Rover that costs about $40,000."; "Eddie started
paying her $2,000-a-month support and he paid for the birth of Christian.";
"He also set up a million-dollar trust fund for Christian and bought the boy and
Tamara a $376,000 house .... ; "He did it by setting up a special trust for
Christian, said a source."; "He paid for the birth and has supported his love
child and the boy's mom for the last two years."; and "She believed Eddie was
just being nice to her so she wouldn't make a big deal about his new son to the
press." The photograph of the house and the car was captioned, "'Eddie paid
for $376,000 home and Tamara's $40,000 Range Rover, insiders say."'
Id. at 4 n.2.
211. See id. at 18-19.
212. The court stated, "[wle cannot say as a matter of law that the qualified loss of
privacy resulting from plaintiffs' association with Mr. Murphy, a celebrity, rendered
Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court denied the Enquirer's
petition for writ of certiorari. 13
Another recent case that is critical of editorial judgment is Green v.
Chicago Tribune Co.21 4  In Green, a woman sued the defendant
newspaper after it published a picture of her dead son, including her
private and intimate statements to him in a hospital room after his death,
as part of an article on Chicago's homicide rate. The newspaper had
obtained the statements and picture by entering the private hospital room
and "eavesdropping" on the plaintiff's conversation with her dead
child.16 In evaluating the newsworthiness of the statements, the Illinois
Appellate Court, in a manner similar to the Winstead court, focused on
the specific photographs and statements, not the general topic of gang
warfare.
21 7
After focusing on the specific picture and statements, the court held
that reasonable minds could differ over whether the picture and
statements were newsworthy and allowed plaintiff's case to go to trial.2"8
In doing so, it rejected the newspaper's argument that the information
was privileged because it fulfilled the public's curiosity in a newsworthy
event.2"9 This decision is even more daring than Winstead, because it
their personal financial affairs newsworthy.... While the fact of that support may be
newsworthy, the financial details may not." Id. at 18.
213. See 516 U.S. 1009 (1995); 'Enquirer' Must Defend Privacy Suit in Eddie
Murphy Case, USA TODAY (May 28, 1996) <http://www.usatoday.com/news/courtl
nscot003.htm>.
214. 675 N.E.2d 249 (Ii. App. Ct. 1996).
215. Seeid. at251.
216. After the boy died on the operating table, the hospital staff moved his body to a
private hospital room, where the following statements by his mother, which appeared in
the article, were made:
"I love you, Calvin. I have been telling you for the longest time about this
street thing." "I love you, sweetheart. That is my baby. The Lord has taken
him, and I don't have to worry about him anymore. I accept it." 'They took
him out of this troubled world. The boy has been troubled for a long time. Let
the Lord have him."
Id.
217. The court stated:
The Tribune argues the subject of the... article was the death toll from guns
and gang warfare, which, like the subject of drug use, is of legitimate public
concern. In our view, however, the relevant inquiry is whether the photograph




219. In rebuking the argument, the court relied on the Restatement:
[t]he extent of the authority to make public private facts is not...
unlimited.... In determining what is a matter of legitimate public interest,
account must be taken of the customs and conventions of the community; and
in the last analysis what is proper becomes a matter of community mores. The
line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giving of information to
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addressed a newspaper's reporting of the effects of crime, rather than the
softer, more titillating subject of unique love relationships.
2. Recent Victorious Television Cases
Printed news is not the only media area to feel the impact of the
private facts tort. In Baugh v. CBS, Inc. ,220 a domestic violence victim
sued a television station after she was included in a newsmagazine
broadcast on victim assistance programs." Immediately following a
domestic violence dispute involving the police, a news crew
accompanying the victim assistance team filmed the plaintiff.= The
plaintiff was unaware that the camera crew was part of a local news
magazine filming for a special on victim assistance programs. m In that
case, the television station argued that the broadcast was privileged
because it concerned a matter of legitimate public interest.?" Once again
the court did not agree; although domestic violence in general was of
legitimate public concern, the court was not convinced that plaintiffs
personal involvement in domestic violence was newsworthy as a matter
of law.tm
A more complicated and potentially far-reaching decision was made in
Veillux v. NBC, 226 a case involving the popular television newsmagazine
Dateline.227 In Veillux, a cross-country truck driver sued National
which the public is entitled, and becomes a morbid and sensational prying into
private lives for its own sake, with which a reasonable member of the public,
with decent standards, would say that he had no concern.
Id. at 256 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (1977)).
220. 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
221. See id. at 750-52.
222. See id. at 750.
223. See id. at 751.
224. See id. at 755.
225. See id.
226. 8 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D. Me. 1998).
227. See id. at 29. This case was not the first time Dateline found itself in legal
difficulty for questionable news practices. In 1993, General Motors sued Dateline for
defamation after Dateline broadcast GM pickup truck crash tests that had been secretly
rigged with remote operated explosives. The lawsuit prompted the resignation of the
president of NBC news, three senior producers, numerous reporters, and an on air
apology and retraction by Dateline co-anchors. See Thomas D. Yannucci, Debunking
"The Big Chill"--Why Defamation Suits by Corporations are Consistent with the First
Amendment, 39 ST. LOUIS. U. L.J. 1187, 1188-1200 (1995). In 1992, a company
specializing in overseas rescues of American children also sued Dateline for defamation.
The lawsuit followed a segment entitled Rambo Goes to Reykjavik, and portrayed the
plaintiffs as money wasting vigilantes of questionable ability. NBC's 1994 motions to
Broadcasting Company (NBC) for revealing that he had failed a drug
test in a segment on trucking and highway safety.2n The trucker had
agreed to be accompanied by Dateline reporters on a cross-country trip,
on the premise that the interview would be used to portray a positive
image of the trucking industry.229 However, the final broadcast claimed
that during the trip plaintiff had falsified his logs, exceeded federal
driving hour limitations, and lied to federal inspectors.230 It also included
interviews with an organization hostile to the trucking industry, and
most importantly, revealed that plaintiff had failed a drug test prior to
the trip. In addition to other claims, the trucker asserted a private facts
claim for revealing the drug test results on national television.
Consistent with other recent cases involving private facts claims, the
U.S. District Court of Maine held as a matter of law that the disclosure
of the failed drug test was not a matter of legitimate public concern23' In
distinguishing between the general topic of drug use among truck drivers
and the identity of a specific, otherwise unknown, trucker who failed a
drug test, the court stated, "[c]ontrary to [d]efendants' claim, working in
a private, albeit heavily regulated, industry such as interstate trucking
does not render one's life 'public' [and] thus open to increased scrutiny
by the press." ' By allowing the trucker's case to go to trial, the court
dismiss the lawsuit were denied, but NBC eventually prevailed on summary judgment in
1997. See Corporate Training Unlimited, Inc. v. NBC, 981 F. Supp. 112 (E.D.N.Y.
1997); Corporate Training Unlimited, Inc. v. NBC, 868 F. Supp. 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
228. See Veilleux, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 30.
229. Dateline decided to do the piece following a tragic accident where a fatigued
truck driver killed four teenagers. When Dateline attempted to find a trucker to
interview for the story, his employer recommended plaintiff. See id. at 29. However,
prior to the interview, plaintiff and Dateline apparently settled on several ground rules to
be followed. The program was to show the positive side of the trucking industry,
plaintiff would not violate federally mandated driving hour limits for Dateline, and the
Parents Against Tired Truckers (PATT) would not be involved with the show. See id. In
fact, plaintiff threatened to terminate the entire project when the producer stated that
Dateline wanted to show the driver "falsifying his logbook and evading inspection
stations." Id. at 30. After the plaintiff's adamant objections, the producer withdrew the
request, agreeing to do the segment along plaintiff's wishes. See id.
230. See Veilleux, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 30.
231. See id. The program concluded by stating "American highways are a trucker's
killing field." Id.
232. See id. at 36-37. Apparently, plaintiff provided the information that he had
tested positive for drugs only after being assured that it would be kept "off the record."
See id. at 39.
233. See id. at 38.
234. Id. at 38. In reaching its decision, the court relied on the Ninth Circuit's
distinction in Virgil that the public's interest about some general activity does not
automatically extend to the private facts of people engaged in that activity.
Defendants have presented no evidence that [the driver] ever drove under the
influence of drugs or that he was an unsafe driver. They can point to no
legitimate reason why the public should be informed that this particular driver
tested positive for drug use. Were the [c]ourt to hold... that private behavior
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implied that the imposition of liability for disclosing truthful information
does not necessarily violate the First Amendment.35
3. First Internet Case
Even the emerging, high-speed transmission arena of the Internet is
unable to escape the recent reappearance of the private facts tort. In
Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group, Inc.,36 a well-known
celebrity, Bret Michaels. 7 sued an Internet adult video distributor to
prevent the Internet distribution of a pornographic video depicting him
having sex with well-known actress Pamela Anderson Lee.3 In addition
to other claims, the plaintiff contended that distributing the video via the
Internet would constitute a public disclosure of private facts. 39 The
adult entertainment defendant argued that the sex acts were newsworthy
of a truck driver constitutes a matter of legitimate public concern simply
because such behavior may in theory affect his or her performance on the road,
it would seriously impair the right of privacy and open the door to further
intrusion into the lives of private individuals whenever their behavior carries
with it merely the potential to harm others.
Id.
235. In a related factual scenario, a Sacramento radio station and other media
defendants recently settled out of court with a plaintiff after her private telephone
conversation with her sister was broadcast nationwide as part of a radio stunt. See
Cathleen Ferraro, Radio Station to Air Apology, Make Donation to Women's Group,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 10, 1998, at B3, available in 1998 WL 8845224. The plaintiff
and her sister were playing an on-air game that included a question about her sexual
practices. See id. After the plaintiff refused to answer the question, the plaintiff alleged
that the radio hosts told her and her sister they would "be right back" and placed the
women on hold. Id. While on hold, the two sisters disclosed the answer to the sexual
question to each other, which was simultaneously recorded and broadcast nationwide
without their knowledge. See id. Although the defendants did not admit to any liability,
the radio station aired two public apologies, paid a financial award to the plaintiff,
donated an undisclosed amount of money to a Sacramento women's organization, and
publicly "promise[d] that the 'Don and Mike Show' will 'not broadcast any
conversations in violation of applicable law."' Id.
236. 5 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
237. Bret Michaels is the popular lead singer for the rock and roll band "Poison."
See id. at 828.
238. See id. at 828. Pamela Anderson Lee is best known as a former Playboy model
and the former star of the popular television series "Baywatch." See Martha Frankel,
Very Important Pamela: Star of "VIP," COsMOPOLrrAN, Oct. 1, 1998, at 264. The
videotape in question was previously recorded by the plaintiffs and provided to the
defendant by an associate of Michaels who had received a copy of the tape as a gift. See
Michaels, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 832.
239. See id. at 839.
due to Lee's sex symbol reputation and Michael's status as a rock star.m
The court, in the first Internet case dealing with the private facts tort,241
rejected the adult entertainment distributor's claim that the pornographic
tape was newsworthy. 2 Applying the California three-prong test, the
court stated that the social value of the videotape was minimal, the depth
of intrusion was significant, and the plaintiffs had acceded to their
fame.243 Balancing these factors, the court concluded that because "[t]he
first two factors weigh heavily against a finding of newsworthiness ....
[P]laintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success in meeting their
burden to show that the contents of the [t]ape are not covered by the
newsworthiness privilege." 4 The court's decision, which was likely
influenced by the concept of decency, may have far-reaching
implications for the future of the Internet.25
D. Other Recent Cases
Four additional decisions that do not fall into any discrete categories
warrant mention. In Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,26 two young female
customers sued a photo lab under all four invasion of privacy torts after
employees allegedly circulated a picture of the two women showering
naked together.247  Apparently, the undeveloped picture was
unknowingly contained in a roll of film the women gave Wal-Mart to be
developed. 24' Two lower courts dismissed the plaintiffs' claims because
Minnesota had not previously recognized any of the common law
240. See id. at 840. Additionally, the defendant argued that since Lee had
previously appeared nude in magazines and pictures, the video of her having sex did not
include private facts. See id. However, the court distinguished between the two in
finding that "[t]he fact that she has performed a role involving sex does not, however,
make her real sex life open to the public." Id.
241. A U.S. District Court in Michigan recently dismissed the second Internet case
dealing with the private facts tort. In Jessup-Morgan v. America Online, Inc., 20 F.
Supp. 2d 1105 (E.D. Mich. 1998), the plaintiff sued America Online (AOL), an Internet
service provider, after AOL disclosed her as the owner of a specific e-mail account in
response to a civil subpoena. See id. at 1107. A third party had subpoenaed the
information after a harassing and allegedly injurious e-mall was posted to an Internet
electronic billboard under the plaintiff's e-mail account. See id. at 1106-07. The court,
after determining that Virginia law should govern the claim, dismissed plaintiff's case on
the basis that Virginia did not recognize the private facts tort. See id. at 1109.
242. See Michaels, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 842.
243. See id. at 841-42.
244. Id. at 842.
245. For a detailed discussion of privacy concerns with the Internet, see infra Part
IV.E,4.
246. 582 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. 1998).
247. See id. at 232-33.
248. See id.
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invasion of privacy torts. 9 However, the Minnesota Supreme Court
reversed the lower court decisions by recognizing three of the four
invasion of privacy torts, including the private facts tort.50 Without
discussing the merits of the claim further, the court stated that naked
pictures generally warranted privacy protection, and remanded the case
for further proceedings."'
In a similar lawsuit, G.J.D. v. Johnson, 2 a woman and her children
brought a private facts action against the estate of the mother's former
boyfriend.5 3 The plaintiffs alleged that the decedent disseminated
sexually explicit nude pictures of the mother at a county fair, the
children's school bus stop, local high school football games, family
mailboxes, and other public gatherings involving family and friends.'
The woman had ended an abusive relationship with the decedent shortly
before the pictures had begun appearing."S The trial court returned a
verdict for the plaintiffs and awarded compensatory and punitive
damages6 The Pennsylvania Superior Court refused to overturn the
jury verdict on appeal,27 and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld
the award of punitive damages due to the outrageous nature of the
decedent's conduct?"8
In another landmark private facts case, Smith v. Calvary Christian
Church,29 a parishioner sued his former church and pastor after the
249. See id. at 233.
250. See id. at 235. The court stated, "Today we join the majority of jurisdictions
and recognize the tort of invasion of privacy. The right to privacy is an integral part of
our humanity .... " Id.
251. See id.
252. 669 A.2d 378 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995), affid on other grounds, 713 A.2d 1127
(Pa. 1998).
253. See G.J.D., 669 A.2d at 379. The former boyfriend's estate was substituted for
the defendant after he committed suicide prior to the trial. See id. at 380.
254. See id. at 380. The decedent took the pictures of the plaintiff during their five-
year physically abusive relationship. See id. at 379-80. One of the pictures was a naked
photograph of the woman; the second picture showed her "performing oral sex on an
unidentifiable male." Id. at 380. Additionally, the pictures were captioned, "Suck
lollipops for money, [plaintiff's name], [plaintiff's phone number], New Bloomfield,
PA." Id.
255. See id. at 379.
256. See id. at 380.
257. See id. at 380 n.1.
258. See G.J.D. v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127, 1131 (Pa. 1998). The only issue on
appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was the question of punitive damages, not the
decedent's culpability or the award of compensatory damages. See id. at 1128.
259. 592 N.W.2d 713 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
pastor disclosed details of a private confession given ten-years earlier.'
During a church service attended by the plaintiff, his wife, his family
and other friends, the pastor announced to the entire congregation that
the plaintiff had previously engaged in extra-marital sex with
prostitutes.' The trial court granted the defendant's summary judgment
motion on the basis that the disclosure should be governed by religious
doctrine, not civil doctrine. 2 However, the appellate court reversed and
remanded, holding that the plaintiff sufficiently pled that the disclosure
was not of legitimate public concern to the congregation. 26
In yet another private facts decision, Hoskins v. Howard,24 plaintiffs
sued a sheriff's deputy and his wife for eavesdropping, and later
disclosing, details of a cordless telephone conversation intercepted with
a borrowed police scanner.' Details of the illegally recorded
conversation, which concerned an alleged murder plot, were
subsequently disclosed during a local radio station broadcast.26 The
defendants argued that there could be no expectation to privacy
concerning cordless phone conversations. 267 The trial court agreed and
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.m However, the
appellate court disagreed, holding that the privacy expectation for
cordless phone conversations was a genuine issue of material fact for the
jury to decide.2 69
E. Reasons for the Apparent Shift Toward Limiting the
Newsworthiness Defense, and Predicted Future Private Facts Conflicts
The recent case law clearly illustrates an emerging trend of successful
plaintiffs in private facts suits. The more difficult question, however, is
why plaintiffs have been successful in recent years, especially in view of
past Supreme Court treatment of the tort. In light of the large number of
very recent cases and society's increased concerns over privacy interests,
it would be disingenuous to just brush these cases off as anomalies2'0
260. See id. at 715.
261. See id.
262. See id. at 716.
263. See id. at 721-22.
264. 971 P.2d 1135 (Idaho 1998).
265. See id. at 1136-37.
266. See id. at 1137. The local county sheriff's department, due to the recording's
illegally obtained nature and inadmissibility at trial, did not act upon the conversation.
See id.
267. See id. at 1140.
268. See id. at 1141-42.
269. See id. at 1142.
270. For example, an August 18, 1998, telephone public opinion poll declared that
69% of the American public believed that the United States President's affair with a
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This section provides an analysis of the shifting judicial attitude towards
newsworthiness.
1. Judicial Willingness to Protect Confidential Medical Information
and Defend Protected Classes
As previously discussed, one possible justification for the recent trend
is a judicial willingness to protect confidential medical information and
defend certain politically sensitive protected class plaintiffs.2 7' Several
courts dealing with such plaintiffs recently have selectively applied
portions of the Restatement and previous case law in reaching their
decisions. For example, in Multimedia, the court, in protecting the
confidentiality of AIDS victims, failed to discuss the Restatement's
inclusion of rare diseases as newsworthy events."
Additionally, although the Restatement includes the birth of a child to
a young minor as an example of a newsworthy item, the court in Doe v.
Mills held that the identity of a minor undergoing the controversial
procedure of abortion was not newsworthy. 73 In another example,
despite declaring a domestic violence incident newsworthy, the court in
Baugh spared the victim's claim on the basis that her involvement was
not newsworthy as a matter of law, without elaborating on the
White House intern, although highly trumpeted by the news media, was a private matter.
See "I Mislead People," TME, Aug. 31, 1998, at 31. Six months later, following the
public revelation of thong underwear, a semen-stained dress and cigar sex toys, and after
a partisan House impeachment and Senate acquittal, the Clinton scandal was credited for
raising society's awareness of invasion of privacy issues. See Kenneth T. Walsh, The
Price of Victory, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Feb. 22, 1999, at 29-30.
271. See supra Part IV.A-B.
272. See Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
AIDS, however, is classified as a rare disease by the National Organization for Rare
Disorders (NORD). See NORD-Rare Disease Database (visited May 26, 1999)
<http://www.rarediseases.org/lof/lof.html>. Compare Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v.
Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491, 495 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (classifying the identities of AIDS
victims as not newsworthy) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. g
(1977) (including rare diseases as an example of newsworthy items). But cf. Lee v.
Calhoun, 948 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that a doctor's statement to the media
that his patient had AIDS was sufficiently related to a medical malpractice lawsuit of
legitimate public concern, because the doctor claimed that his incorrect diagnosis of the
patient was affected by the fact the patient didn't tell him that he had AIDS).
273. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. g (1977) (declaring
the "birth of a child to a twelve-year-old girl" a newsworthy event) with Doe v. Mills,
536 N.W.2d 824 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that an abortion was not a
newsworthy event without discussing the plaintiff's minor status).
distinction between a person's involvement and the incident itself. 4
While the selective application of law is not a new legal phenomenon, its
application in private facts cases is an emerging trend.
2. Selection of Non-Media Defendants
A second possible rationale for the recent success of the tort may be
plaintiffs' skillful selection of non-media defendants. Taking a cue from
the Supreme Court's wariness in finding against media defendants,
plaintiffs are increasingly suing non-media defendants in private facts
actions. For example, since the Florida Star decision, there have been at
least sixty private facts decisions involving employers alone.2 5 By
274. See Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745, 755 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
275. See Doe v. Hendersonville Hosp. Corp., No. 97-5853, 1999 WL 68767, at *1
(6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1999) (former sales engineer suing employer following disclosure of
confidential medical information to other employees); Conway v. Cook County, No. 98
C 5324, 1999 WL 14497, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 1999) (former employee suing employer
following her manager's disclosure of her breast augmentation surgery to other
employees); Blackwell v. Harris Chem. N. Am., Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1305 (D.
Kan. 1998) (chemical company employee suing former employer following disclosure of
her illness to other employees); Chisholm v. Foothill Capital Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 925,
939-40 (N.D. Hl. 1998) (former executive suing financial services employer following
disclosure of her extramarital affair to business client); Ferraro v. City of Long Branch,
714 A.2d 945, 947-51 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (former public works director
suing city after mayor released copies of his medical report to the press); Marino v.
Arandell Corp., 1 F. Supp. 2d 947, 948 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (employee suing employer
following release of his Hepatitis C medical information to other co-workers); Wayne v.
Genesis Med. Ctr., 140 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 1998) (ophthalmologist suing former
hospital following disclosure of her past misconduct to a prospective employer); Martin
v. Johnson, 975 P.2d 889, 891-92 (Okla. 1998) (teacher suing former school district for
alleged private facts disclosure as part of multi-count lawsuit); Swanson v. Civil Air
Patrol, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1330 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (former employee suing employer
after disclosure of sleeping arrangements to other employees); Wilson v. Proctor &
Gamble, No. C-970778, 1998 WL 769718, at *1-2, (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 6, 1998)
(technician suing employer following announcement of sexual harassment investigation
results at a team meeting); Aguinaga v. Sanmina Corp., No. 3:97-CV-1026-G,
1998 WL 241260, at *5 (N.D. Tex. May 04, 1998) (employee suing former supervisor
following threats to disclose sexually compromising pictures of employee); French v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 128, 130-31 (D. Mass. 1998) (former UPS
manager suing employer following pressure to disclose the details of a party-related
accident involving other UPS employees at the manager's home); Tidman v. Salvation
Army, No. 01-A-01-9708-CV00380, 1998 WL 391765, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 15,
1998) (former Salvation Army officers suing their superior officers following disclosure
of extramarital affair); Gates v. City of Dallas, No. Civ.A.3:96-CV-2198-D, 1998 WL
133004, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 1998) (police department employee suing city for
private facts disclosure as part of multi-count lawsuit); Dancy v. Fina Oil & Chem. Co.,
3 F. Supp. 2d 737, 738 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (refinery employees suing employer following
publication of a list of employees with excessive work absences); Emberger v. Deluxe
Check Printers, No. Civ. A. 96-7043, 1997 WL 677149, at *1-7 (E.D. Pa. Oct 30, 1997)
(manager suing former employer following disclosure of alleged suicide note to therapist
and other third parties); Morris v. Ameritech, No. 96 C 4398, 1997 WL 652345, at *1-2
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 14, 1997) (telephone company employee suing employer for publishing
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information from alleged eavesdropping); Logan v. West Coast Benson Hotel, 981 F.
Supp. 1301, 1321 (D. Or. 1997) (hotel employee suing employer following disclosure of
her resume and other personal information to unauthorized personnel); Stien v. Marriott
Ownership Resorts, Inc., 944 P.2d 374, 376-77 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (hotel employee
suing employer following the showing of embarrassing video at company Christmas
party); Gross v. Taylor, No. Civ. A. 96-6514, 1997 WL 535872, at *6-7 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
5, 1997) (police officers suing police department following broadcast of their police car
conversations via hidden microphone system); Ozer v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 374
(Colo. 1997) (attorney suing law firm following disclosure of his homosexual status and
possible HIV infection to other employees); Crockett v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc.,
No. B 104407, 1997 WL 271104, at *9 (Cal. Ct App. Mar. 18, 1997) (former employee
suing employer after notice of impending sexual harassment investigation was published
on company bulletin board); Caspary v. State, No. 36689-1-I, 1997 WL 103688, at *10
(Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 1997), (corrections officer suing prison following disclosure
that he was HIV infected to prison staff); Doe v. Group Health Coop., Inc.,
932 P.2d 178, 179-81 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (health care provider employee suing
employer following disclosure of his past mental health treatment in department training
manual), overruled by Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333, 339 (Wash. 1998); Minckler
v. Exxon Corp., No. 05-95-01015-CV, 1997 WL 34021, at *1 (Tex. App. Jan. 30, 1997)
(foreman suing employer following disclosure of drug test results); Rudas v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 96-5987, 1997 WL 11302, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 1997)
(insurance company attorney suing employer following disclosure of her past sexual
harassment experiences to third party); Pucci v. USAir, 940 F. Supp. 305, 307 (M.D. Fla.
1996) (airline employee suing former employer for alleged private facts disclosure as
part of a multi-count lawsuit); McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 622 (3d Cir.
1996) (store employee suing employer following disclosure of employee's AIDS disease
to friend of employee); Lansing Ass'n of Sch. Adm'rs v. Lansing Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 549 N.W.2d 15 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (school administrators suing school board
to prevent disclosure of past performance evaluations); Roehrbom v. Lambert,
660 N.E.2d 180, 183 (11. App. Ct. 1995) (probation officer suing former employer
following disclosure of failed psychological testing evaluations to training institute); Doe
v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 72 F.3d 1133, 1138-39 (3d Cir. 1995)
(public transportation employee suing employer following disclosure of his HIV related
prescriptions in company report); Nobles v. Cartwright, 659 N.E.2d 1064, 1073 (Ind.
App. 1995) (state lottery employee suing lottery commission following disclosure of
employee's sexual harassment charges against lottery director); Patton v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 910 F. Supp. 1250, 1276 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (UPS employee suing employer
following disclosure of property mishandling incident); Porter v. Royal Oak,
542 N.W.2d 905, 907 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (former police officer suing city for
disclosing details of disciplinary actions against him); Scarborough v. Brown Group,
Inc., 935 F. Supp. 954, 964 (W.D. Tenn. 1995) (former employee suing employer
following disclosure of adverse information to prospective new employer); Greenwood
v. Taft, 663 N.E.2d 1030, 1031 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (attorney suing former law firm
following disclosure of private information regarding his male partner to other members
of firm); Keenan v. Allan, 889 F. Supp. 1320, 1392 (E.D. Wash. 1995) (court employee
suing employer following disclosure of her previous grievances to newspaper editor);
Blackthorne v. Posner, 883 F. Supp. 1443, 1456 (D. Or. 1995) (computer store manager
suing employer following alleged disclosure of private medical and family information
to third parties); Yeager v. Harrah's Club, Inc., 897 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Nev. 1995) (casino
assistant manager suing former employer for private facts disclosure as part of a multi-
count lawsuit); Gallo v. Princeton Univ., 656 A.2d 1267, 1276 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
pursuing non-media defendants, plaintiffs avoid the First Amendment
conflict regarding judicial editing of the press. As discussed by one
court, there is a difference between suing the press for reporting news, as
in Cox, and suing an agency that chooses to make a private matter
1995) (facilities official suing university following disclosure of misconduct
investigation in university bulletin); Handler v. Arends, No. 0527732 S, 1995 WL
107328, at *1 (Conn. Super. 1995) (university professor suing former employer
following disclosure of her tenure denial in departmental meeting); Seta v. Reading
Rock, Inc., 654 N.E.2d 1061, 1063-1068 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (accountant suing
employer following telephone disclosure of her drug-related termination to third party);
Merlo v. United Way of Am., 43 F.3d 96, 103 (4th Cir. 1994) (former charity treasurer
suing employer following disclosure of the potential misuse of funds in report to board
of governors); Smith v. Arkansas La. Gas Co., 645 So. 2d 785, 790-91 (La. App. 1994)
(former manager suing employer following disclosure of alleged sexual harassment to
other company officials); Hawley v. Atlantic Cellular Tel. Corp., No. Civ. 93-362-P-H,
1994 WL 505029, at *3 (D. Me. Sep. 2, 1994) (telephone company account executive
suing employer following disclosure of an improper transactions investigative report to
third parties); Moore v. Sun Pub. Corp., 881 P.2d 735, 742 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994)
(newspaper publisher suing former employer following disclosure of the reason for his
termination to county law firms); Sedlak v. Lotto, No. CV 92 328128, 1994 WL 685000,
at ;3 (Conn. Super. Nov. 29, 1994) (shipping department employee suing employer
following repeated verbal disclosures concerning her marriage, grooming and
intelligence to other employees); Carriker v. American Postal Workers Union, No.
13900, 1993 WL 385807, at *18 (Ohio Ct. App. Sep. 30, 1993) (union secretary suing
union following disclosure of details of her work agreement in letter to union
membership); Battenfield v. Harvard Univ., No. 915089F, 1993 WL 818920, at *8
(Mass. Super. Aug. 31, 1993) (assistant director of university department suing
university following disclosure of her salary, job description and thesis to third parties);
Elliott v. Healthcare Corp., 629 A.2d 6, 9 (D.C. 1993) (hospital administrator suing
former employer following disclosure of the reasons for his termination to
unemployment compensation board); Hines v. Arkansas La. Gas Co., 613 So. 2d 646,
648-49 (La. App. 1993) (former supervisor suing employer following disclosure of
alleged sexual harassment to other company officials); Kersey v. Dennison Mfg. Co.,
No. Civ. A. 89-2650-MA, 1992 WL 71390, at *6 (D. Mass. Feb. 21, 1992) (patent
employee suing former employer following disclosure of substandard work assessment
report to other employees); LePore v. Ramsey, No. 90-1469, 90-1471, 1991 WL 197376,
at *1 (4th Cir. Oct. 7, 1991) (secretary suing employer following disclosure of "talking
points" memo discussing her previous sexual harassment complaints); Swanson v.
Village of Lake in the Hills, No. 87 C 20352, 1991 WL 293270, at *12-13 (N.D. III. Apr.
18, 1991) (police sergeant suing former employer following alleged disclosure of
psychological examination to newspaper reporters); Harris v. Neff, No. 88-1650,
1991 WL 42294, at *5-6 (D. Kan. Mar. 25, 1991) (insurance company sales
representative suing former employer following disclosure of her ongoing drug and
alcohol abuse treatment to co-workers); Wilhite v. H.E. Butt Co., 812 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tex.
App. 1991) (discharged employee suing former employer following disclosure of facts
surrounding his termination to other management personnel), abrogated on other
grounds by Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Tex. 1994); Young v. Jackson,
572 So.2d 378, 379-81 (Miss. 1990) (nuclear power plant worker suing employer
following disclosure of her hysterectomy to other employees); Miller v. Motorola, Inc.,
560 N.E.2d 900, 902 (Ill. App. Ct.1990) (employee suing employer following disclosure
of mastectomy surgery to other workers); Roe v. Cradduck, 555 N.E.2d 1155, 1157 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990) (former day care employee suing employer following disclosure of the
reason for her discharge to parents of day care students).
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public.27 Although the employment claims to date have been mostly
unsuccessful, the private facts tort will likely emerge as a potent weapon
in arenas such as employment law due to diminished First Amendment
concerns.
2n
3. Increase of Tabloid Journalism
Thirdly, the cases may represent a judicial backlash against media
defendants for abusing the wide discretion they had previously been
given in private facts cases. The Restatement, "leave-it-to-the-press,"
California three-prong, and "logical nexus" approaches all provide the
media leeway in determining newsworthiness. As a result, liability for
editorial indiscretion had been reserved only for extreme cases. 2
However, alleged media invasions of privacy have advanced beyond
the "intrusive" reporting of Warren's socialite wedding last century.
The past decade's incredible expansion of media outlets such as cable
television, talk radio, and the Internet has brought a fierce competition
for ratings. This competition has further blurred the line between news
and sensationalism-leading to an increase in extreme disclosures
offending community mores."0 As a result, recent lawsuits against the
276. See Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264,268 (2d Cir. 1994).
277. In such cases, an employer can successfully avoid liability by proving that the
facts were disclosed to persons with a legitimate concern for such information. See, e.g.,
Doe v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 72 F.3d 1133, 1141-42 (3d Cir. 1995).
However, this defense pales in comparison to the daunting First Amendment shield used
by the press.
278. See supra Part III.B.
279. See, e.g., Coplin v. Fairfield Pub. Access Television Comm., 111 F.3d 1395,
1404 (8th Cir. 1997).
280. An excellent example of the blurring between traditional news and
sensationalism recently occurred on the popular television newsmagazine 60 Minutes.
During the final Sunday of the November 1998 sweeps month, 60 Minutes aired a video
of euthanasia advocate Dr. Jack Kevorkian administering a lethal injection to a 52-year-
old man suffering 'from Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS), commonly referred as
"Lou Gehrig's disease." See Don Aucoin, Furor Grows over CBS Tape of Aided Death,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 24, 1998, at Al. Several prominent journalism critics immediately
criticized 60 Minutes for "cross[ing] a dangerous line" for television journalism, and
attempting to turn a tragic death into a "form of news entertainment." Id. The major
criticism focused on the timing of the broadcast, which brought 60 Minutes its highest
television ratings of the season at a time when ratings were measured for advertising
rates. See Carol Morello, Kevorkian Aims for Showdown[,] Critics Blast Videotape as
'Stunt Death,' USA TODAY, Nov. 24, 1998, at 3A. Even though 60 Minutes defended
the videotape as legitimate news regarding a difficult topic, the newsmagazine suffered"some of the harshest criticism ever leveled at the 30-year-old program." Howard Kurtz
and Caryle Murphy, For CBS, Ratings and Reproach; '60 Minutes' Broadcast Raises a
media have been over stomach wrenching disclosures such as: mate-
swapping, barren fertility resulting from multiple abortions, a mother's
highly personal good-bye to her tragically killed son, confidential drug
test results, a home video following a domestic violence incident, and
even a video of a couple engaged in sexual intercourse."1 Although the
newsworthiness defense extends beyond just the reporting of current
events to items dealing with entertainment, education and
enlightenment, the above disclosures are arguably the type of highly
offensive and titillating non-newsworthy disclosures which are "a
morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake. ' z
Thus, judicial intervention is necessary to curb the media's flagrant
abuse of its wide editorial privilege.f 3
4. Concerns Regarding the Increasing Ability to Transmit Private
Information Rapidly over the Internet
The unprecedented, rapid dissemination of information over the
Internet increases the likelihood of future disclosures of highly
offensive, non-newsworthy private facts. This reality of life has not
gone unnoticed, and provides a strong argument for reinvigorating
application of the private facts tort. For example, one can hardly go a
week without discovering a newspaper article or television segment
regarding invasion of privacy concerns and the Internet.2M This is most
likely because the market checks and balances on the media's selection
of newsworthy material are not present with the Internet. In many cases
there are no editors, the source of the information is difficult to identify,
and Web advertising is still in its infancy. As a result, the Internet is
likely to emerge as the next litigation battleground for the private facts
tort, once again calling for an analysis of the newsworthiness defense.
Perhaps the most commonly known Internet privacy issue is the
Furor, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1998, at Al. The television broadcast was later used as
evidence to convict Dr. Kevorkian of second-degree murder. See Kevorkian Guilty of
2nd-Degree Murder, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 27, 1999, at Al. Three weeks later
the judge in the case sentenced Dr. Kevorkian to prison for 10 to 25 years. See Eric
Slatter, Kevorkian Is Sentenced to 10 to 25 Years, L.A. TudEs, Apr. 14, 1999, at Al.
Although the 60 Minutes controversy was not a private facts issue, it clearly
demonstrates the competing interests between traditional news, sensationalism, and
ratings in today's fiercely competitive media market.
281. For a detailed discussion of these cases, see supra Part IV.C.
282. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 652D cmt. h (1977); see id. § 652D cmtj.
283. For a criticism of tabloid television, see Gonzales, supra note 110; Famoso,
supra note 110.
284. See, e.g., Ted Bridis, Net Finns Told to Protect Privacy or Face Laws, SAN
DIEGO UNIGN-TRB., June 24, 1998, at C2; Peeping Toms Find Legal Way to Film, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 27, 1998, at A3; Jim Borgman, Cartoon, SAN Dmoo UNION-
TRIB., July 25, 1998, at G6 (reprinted from CINCINNATI ENQUIRER).
[VOL. 36: 489, 1999] The Tort that Refuses to Go Away
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
dissemination of nude celebrity pictures over the World Wide Web.*2 5
Celebrities provide an immense marketing tool for cyberpornography;
actresses' nude pictures can be quickly copied, disseminated, and placed
on hundreds of cyberporn Web pages, where they serve as "teasers" for
an industry that collected over $50 million in 1996 alone.26 Hollywood,
however, has begun to fight back, and the private facts tort is one tool
available for that fight.27 Use of the tort should be successful against
Internet publishers provided the pictures have not previously been
published.28 Additionally, given the court's comments in Michaels, it is
safe to say that the most pro-free speech definition of the
newsworthiness defense will not apply.29 In view of the current crusade
against this issue,2' and the predicted future growth of cyberporn on the
Web, future private facts lawsuits over previously unpublished nude
pictures are inevitable.
A related emerging issue is the dissemination of non-celebrity
"peeping Tom" pictures on the Internet. Using hidden video cameras,
participants in "cyber peeping" sneak pictures down the blouses and up
the skirts of unsuspecting women in public places, then publish such
pictures on Internet Web sites for profit. 1  Although the secret film
285. See Mitchell D. Kamarck, Empowering Celebrities in Cyberspace: Stripping
the Web of Nude Images, 15 ENT. AND SPORTS LAW, Winter 1998, at 1.
286. See id.
287. See id. at 15. Other legal recourses include violation of copyright,
misappropriation of another's name or likeness, and false light invasion of privacy (if the
photograph is a fake). See id.
288. This is because once the pictures have been previously published, there no
longer can be an expectation of privacy, as they are considered to be in the public
domain. Cf. Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401, 405
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (declaring that nude still photographs taken from a motion picture clip
were not private facts).
289. See supra Part IV.C.3. However, a less clear question is whether naked
pictures copied from a private website constitute public or private facts. Such an inquiry
is beyond the scope of this Comment.
290. Actress Alyssa Milano and her family have actively attempted to remove
celebrity nude pictures from the Internet. The actress' mother founded CyberTrackers, a
company that searches the Internet for nude celebrity pictures, then threatens the owners
of illicit Web pages with legal action if the pictures are not subsequently removed. The
company has made good on its threats; in April of 1998 Alyssa Milano filed the first
lawsuit involving the Internet dissemination of nude still photographs. See Greg Miller,
"Melrose Place" Star Hopes to Pull Plug on Sex Sites, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1998, at
Dl. Milano was awarded a $238,000 default judgment in one lawsuit, and settled out of
court for an undisclosed amount against two other Web sites. See Greg Miller, Actress
Prevails in Suits over Nude Photos on Web, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1998, at C3.
291. See Bill Ainsworth, Proposal Seeks End to "Cyber Peeping," SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., July 9, 1998, at A3.
taking is currently legal because it occurs in public,292 the publication of
such pictures on the Internet most likely falls within the domain of the
private facts tort. However, as a practical matter, it would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, for plaintiffs to win in court for two reasons.
First, it is unlikely that a woman would even know that she had been
photographed and placed on the Web. Second, even if a woman
suspected she had been photographed, the limited nature of the Internet
pictures make determining or proving the victim's identity nearly
impossible. But, in the rare event that a plaintiff could prove the posting
of such pictures on the Internet, such a claim will most likely survive the
newsworthiness defense.293
V. RECOMMENDATION FOR THE FUTURE OF THE TORT
AND THE NEWSWORTHINESS DEFENSE
The current state of the private facts tort, especially the
newsworthiness defense, is confused and incoherent. The varying
definitions of newsworthiness that exist in different jurisdictions are a
burden on both plaintiffs and defendants. Additionally, the harsh, pro-
defendant definitions of newsworthiness promoted in the "refusal" and
"leave-it-to-the-press" approaches undermine victim compensation,
excuse tortuous activity, and serve no deterrent function against
"sensational prying into private lives for its own sake. 294 Likewise, the
vague and unpredictable definitions in the Restatement, California three-
prong, and "logical nexus" approaches potentially deter the
dissemination of legitimate newsworthy information, thus conflicting
with the First Amendment.295  Therefore, by approving a specific
newsworthiness definition the Supreme Court can eliminate the First
292. Since the "oops" pictures are taken in public places such as Disneyland or the
beach, there is no expectation of privacy and thus little criminal legal recourse available.
See Peeping Toms Find Legal Way to Film, SAN DiEGo UNiON-TRI., June 27, 1998, at
A3.
293. Due to the limited ability of the private facts tort to deter such actions, the
California legislature recently turned "cyber peeping" into a crime. On August 26, 1999,
California signed into law a bill that turned "cyber peeping" into a criminal
misdemeanor. See New Law Takes Aim at Video Voyeurism Legislation: Davis Signs a
Bill that Makes It a Misdeameanor to Use a Hidden Camera to Look up Women's Skirts,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1999, at A3. The legislation was prompted by an incident at
Disneyland where a man was noticed taking hidden pictures down the blouses and up the
skirts of women standing in concession lines and getting off rides. See id. The "eyber
peeping" misdemeanor carries a penalty of a $1,000 fine and up to six months in jail.
See id.
294. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (1977); see supra Part
m.B.2-3.
295. See supra Part ITI.B.1 and Part llI.B.4-5.
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Amendment conflict, providing a uniform minimum newsworthiness
standard to be adopted by state courts and legislatures.
A. Problems with Fragmented Case Law
As discussed in Part I, current case law treatment of newsworthiness
is scattered and inconsistent.296  For example, one recent court
proclaimed that "it is clear that establishing viable doctrine in this area
has not been an easy task,"2 while another court has declared it "one of
the... well-defined areas of privacy law.""29 Disclosures of facts that
are newsworthy in one instance may be the basis for liability in another
instance, even within the same jurisdiction or same court! 299 These
inconsistencies go beyond simply the five differing newsworthiness
tests. For example, sometimes newsworthiness is a matter of law,
sometimes it is a matter of fact, and sometimes it is both.3°° Sometimes
newsworthiness is an absolute defense; sometimes it can be overridden
due to the offensiveness of the disclosure.3"' Sometimes a person's
identity can be separated from newsworthy facts; sometimes it can not.2
296. See supra Part III.B.
297. Ayash v. Dana Farber Cancer Inst., No. CIV.A. 96-0565-E, 1997 WL 438769,
at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 9, 1997).
298. Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469,478 (Cal. 1998).
299. Compare Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 771-73 (Ct. App.
1983) (holding that disclosure of a controversial college student body president's
transsexual status had little social utility and thus was not newsworthy), with Sipple v.
Chronicle Publ'g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 670 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the
disclosure of a presidential life-saving hero's homosexual status was newsworthy
because it dispelled the myth that gays were weak, timid and unheroic). For a more
detailed discussion on the disparities between the two cases, see Elford, supra note 13, at
737.
300. Compare Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1345-46 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating
newsworthiness is "a question of law for the courC'), with Hawkins v. Multimedia, Inc.,
344 S.E.2d 145, 146 (S.C. 1986) (declaring "[w]hether a fact is a matter of public
interest is a question of fact to be decided by the jury"), and Winstead v. Sweeney, 517
N.W.2d 874, 877 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that newsworthiness "is a mixed
question of law and fact").
301. Compare Ayash, 1997 WL 438769, at *3 (calling newsworthiness "a complete
defense"), with Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, 492 A.2d 580, 589 (D.C. 1985) (declaring
"[c]ertain private facts about a person should never be publicized, even if the facts
concern matters which are, or relate to persons who are, of legitimate public interest").
302. Compare Doe v. Univision Television Group, Inc., 717 So. 2d 63, 65 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that "while the topic of the broadcast was of legitimate
public concern, the plaintiff's identity was not"), with Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8
F.3d 1222, 1233 (7th Cir. 1993). The court in Haynes rejected the plaintiffs argument
that their names could have been changed in defendant's history book by saying,
Sometimes time impac6 whether a disclosure is newsworthy; sometimes
time is irrelevant.3"3 Sometimes in determining newsworthiness the
standard is whether the disclosure was necessary, while other times it is
not.: 4
Perhaps the best example of the current confusion and
misunderstanding regarding the newsworthiness defense is Shulman v.
Group W Productions,3' the most recent private facts case from the
California Supreme Court. Ironically, the discussion section begins with
the statement, "[t]he claim that a publication has given unwanted
publicity to allegedly private aspects of a person's life is one of the more
commonly litigated and well-defined areas of privacy law."3 6  In
actuality, the plurality decision is far from decisive or well defined, and,
as a practical matter, leaves California private facts law in an incoherent
state." 7
In Shulman, two automobile accident victims sued television
producers after video and audio of their rescue and emergency medical
treatment were broadcast as part of a television documentary on
emergency medical care.0 The broadcast included extraction from the
vehicle and the medical treatment administered to one of the victims,
both on scene and inside a rescue helicopter." The trapped automobile
portion of the broadcast showed pictures of one of the victim's limbs
and torso, and included audio of her first name, age, and her incoherent
and unflattering statements while being extracted.310 The helicopter
[b]ut the use of pseudonyms would not have gotten [defendants] off the legal
hook. The details of [plaintiffs'] lives recounted in the book would identify
them unmistakably to anyone who has known [them] .... [Defendant] would
have had to change some, perhaps many, of the details. But then he would no
longer have been writing history. He would have been writing fiction.
Id. at 1233.
303. Compare Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 40 (Cal. 1971)
(holding that "identification of the actor in reports of long past crimes usually serves
little independent political purpose"), with Shulman, 955 P.2d at 489 (rejecting the
timeliness argument by stating, "[o]ne might argue that, while the contents of the
broadcast were of legitimate interest.., identification of [plaintiff] as the accident
victim [was] irrelevant... in a broadcast that aired some months after the accident and
had little or no value as 'hot' news .... We do not take that view.").
304. Compare Vassiliades, 492 A.2d at 589 (holding that in presenting an issue of
public concern, "it was unnecessary for [defendant] to publicize [plaintiffs]
photographs"), with Shulman, 955 P.2d at 488 (stating that "[t]he standard, however, is
not necessity .... The courts do not, and constitutionally could not, sit as superior
editors of the press.").
305. 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
306. Id. at 478 (emphasis added).
307. The plurality decision includes a concurring opinion and two separate
concurring/dissenting opinions. See id. at 498-504.
308. See id. at 475-76.
309. See id.
310. See id. The court's summary of the dialog exchange between the plaintiff and
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portion of the broadcast showed video of the victim's face, covered by
an oxygen mask, and included audio of her vital signs and lack of foot
sensation."' Although not included in the broadcast, the tragic accident
left the plaintiff a paraplegic." 2
The trial court granted summary judgment for the television producers
on the private facts claim, on the basis of newsworthiness.31 3  The
appellate court reversed in part, stating that the portion of the broadcast
inside the helicopter was private, and that there were triable issues
regarding the newsworthiness of the broadcast.314  On appeal to the
California Supreme Court, supporters of the defendant argued that the
helicopter portion of the broadcast was protected by the First
Amendment because it was "reasonably relate[d]" to a subject matter of
legitimate public concern.315 In contrast, counsel for the victims argued
that showing the plaintiffs intimate personal medical facts and turmoil
wasn't necessary to demonstrate the gravity of the accident and rescue.16
The court spent the majority of the private facts discussion section
addressing the evolution of the private facts tort in detail. Regarding the
emergency care workers follows:
While [plaintiff] is still trapped under the car, [the rescue worker] asks
[plaintiffs] age. [Plaintiff] responds, "I'm old." On further questioning,
[plaintiff] reveals she is 47, and [rescue worker] observes that "it's all relative.
You're not that old." During her extraction from the car, [plaintiff] asks at
least twice if she is dreaming. At one point she asks [the rescue worker], who
has told her she will be taken to the hospital in a helicopter: "Are you teasing?"
At another point she says: "This is terrible. Am I dreaming?" She also asks
what happened and where the rest of her family is, repeating the questions
even after being told she was in an accident and the other family members are
being cared for. While being loaded into the helicopter on a stretcher,
[plaintiff] says: "I just want to die." [The rescue worker] reassures her that she
is "going to do real well," but [plaintiff] repeats: "I just want to die. I don't




313. See id. at 477.
314. See id.
315. See Lee Levine, Brief in Support of Respondents of Amici Curiae, the
American Society of Newspaper Editors, Et. Al. in Shulman v. Group Productions., Ic.,
Court of Appeal, Los Angeles Superior Court, in PRINT AND ELECTRONIc PUBLISHING:
UNDERSTANDING THE LEGAL AND BuSINESS ISSUES FOR BOOKS AND MAGAZINES, at 863,
906 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series
No. S058629, Apr. 1998).
316. See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 488. Additionally, the court considered the
argument that the broadcast served little value as "hot" news because it aired several
months after the actual accident. See id. at 489.
issue of newsworthiness, the court conceded that "[all material that
might attract readers or viewers is not, simply by virtue of its
attractiveness, of legitimate public interest."'317 After citing favorably to
Melvin and Briscoe, the court reviewed the application of the California
three-prong approach in past cases." 8  However, the court then
proceeded to endorse the recent application of the "logical nexus"
approach in other jurisdictions. 9 Finally, using the "logical nexus"
approach, the court rejected plaintiffs argument that the helicopter
disclosures were neither necessary nor relevant to an issue of public
concern.
320
Shulnan clearly demonstrates why the Supreme Court needs to define
what constitutes newsworthiness. According to one critic, the court,
"[a]fter paying lip service to [the previous California three-prong
approach] ... proceed[ed] to ignore their test for assessing
newsworthiness. 32' Additionally, the court misapplied the "logical
nexus" test, as reasonable minds could differ in evaluating whether
plaintiffs name and personal medical information were substantially
relevant to the general newsworthy topic of emergency medical care.3 '
A second critic has argued that the plurality relied on both Melvin and
Briscoe in justifying their decision, two cases which likely would not
survive the Supreme Court's holding in Cox protecting items of public
record from liability.3 z In short, Shulman has turned the newsworthiness
defense in California into a mess-not because of its finding for the
television producers, but rather because of the plurality's inconsistent
and confusing application of precedent case law. As a result, after
Shulman it is unclear what is and is not newsworthy in California, which
potentially chills free speech. Therefore, the issue once again beckons
Supreme Court attention.
317. Id. at 483-84.
318. See id. at 481-83.
319. See id. at 484-85. For a discussion of the "logical nexus" approach, see supra
Part ll.B.5.
320. See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 488-89. Regarding plaintiff's necessity argument,
the court responded by saying, "[tihe courts do not, and constitutionally could not, sit as
superior editors of the press." Id. at 488. Likewise, the court rebuked the argument that
plaintiff's identity served little purpose as "hot" news:
We do not take that view. It is difficult to see how the subject broadcast could
have been edited to avoid completely any possible identification without
severely undercutting its legitimate descriptive and narrative impact.... In a
video documentary of this type, however, the use of that degree of truthful
detail would seem not only relevant, but essential to the narrative.
Id. at 489.
321. Id. at 502 (Brown & Baxter, JJ., concurring and dissenting).
322. See id. at 503 (Brown & Baxter, JJ., concurring and dissenting).
323. See id. at 500 (Kennard & Mosk, JJ., concurring).
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B. The Supreme Court Should Declare a Minimum Standard for
Defining Newsworthiness
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court needs to stop its limited
case-by-case narrow analysis regarding newsworthiness in favor of a
broad ruling establishing the bounds of the defense. The payoff for such
a definition would be immense-it would provide the common law with
a minimum standard for the newsworthiness defense, thus placing
plaintiffs and defendants on firm ground in evaluating the private facts
arena. The challenge for such a ruling, however, is in providing a
general definition that withstands First Amendment scrutiny but won't
"swallow up the tort" when applied to specific factual scenarios. A
modified version of the California three-prong approach, which
incorporates the "logical nexus" approach and certain defamation
principles, can live up to such high standards.
1. Proposed Newsworthiness Standard
A minimum and predictable standard for determining newsworthiness
could be established through a two-part balancing test. The proposed
test would weigh the social use of the published facts against the
associated prying into private information. However, similar to the
different intent requirements in defamation law,324 the burden of proof
for establishing newsworthiness under the two-part test would vary
based upon the status of the plaintiff. As explained below, such a
balancing of newsworthiness and burden of proof placement would
promote an open discussion of public affairs, provide the media an
incentive to self-evaluate the newsworthiness of issues dealing with
private individuals, and be consistent with current First Amendment law.
a. Newsworthiness Test
Regardless of who has the burden of proving newsworthiness or lack
thereof,311 the substantive test for determining whether a matter is
newsworthy should be uniform. Additionally, it should be easy to
324. Due to First Amendment concerns, the Supreme Court has mandated differing
proof requirements when suing media defendants for defamation. In defamation cases,
the intent requirement of the tort varies based on the public or private status of the
plaintiff. See infra notes 337-38.
325. See infra Part V.B.I.b.
comprehend, and liberal enough to reserve liability for extreme cases so
as not to unduly inhibit free speech. The following proposed
newsworthiness standard accomplishes that result by balancing the
social use of the information against the intrusiveness of the prying.
(1) Are Facts of Social Use?
The first prong under the proposed newsworthiness test adopts the
pre-Shulman California standard of whether the facts are of social use.
However, the inquiry can not end there; without further definition,
"social use" is a vague term that can be manipulated to meet the needs of
the trier of fact. To avoid such vagueness, in determining whether the
facts are of social use, there should be a requirement that they be
"substantially related" '326 to a matter of legitimate public concern.
Therefore, the first element of the proposed newsworthiness standard
incorporates the "logical nexus" approach to determine the social use of
the disclosed information.
As a result, as long as the matters are substantially related to a matter
of legitimate public concern, they should be considered to be of social
use. The standard recognizes the growing trend in case law and the
advantages of the "logical nexus" approach. 27 By requiring a significant
link between the facts and a matter of legitimate public interest, the
substantially related test for determining social use meets the
Restatement's goal that legitimate public interest does not include "a
morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake."
328
Recognizing, however, that this standard potentially places everyone's
life into public view due to common associations with a matter of public
interest,329 the social use element must be balanced with a second
element to preserve privacy interests.
(2) Extent of Prying into Private Lives for Information
The second element of the proposed newsworthiness test is the extent
to which the facts represent a prying into someone's personal life.
Although some elements of an individual's personal life may be
newsworthy, it does not follow that every aspect of their life is
newsworthy. Thus, to determine newsworthiness, it is necessary to
balance the social use of the disclosed facts against the extent of the
326. "Substantially related" is a term of art to show a significant link between the
facts and a matter of public concern. It should not be confused with constitutional law
"intermediate scrutiny" analysis in equal protection clause cases.
327. See supra Part Hm.B.5.
328. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 652D cmt. h (1977).
329. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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prying into a person's personal life.
The social use of information may be diminished due to the
intrusiveness associated with obtaining or providing that information.
For example, as Michaels clearly demonstrates, there is a significant
difference between discussing the details of someone's sexual life, and
showing graphic video of the same details.3 Both pictures of sexual
acts and words indicating a sexual relationship serve the same social
entertainment use of providing the details of Hollywood relationships.
However, most people would agree that sexually graphic pictures are far
more intrusive than gossiping words. Therefore, one can easily infer
that the additional factor of intrusiveness associated with the video of
sexual acts diminishes the newsworthiness of that information. In other
words, the more significant the prying, the higher the social use must be
for it to be considered newsworthy.
33'
Balancing the extent of the prying against the social use of the
disclosed information is a necessary check that preserves privacy while
still protecting newsworthiness. It is only when the intrusiveness
outweighs the social use that the information is not newsworthy. This
standard protects dissemination of all non-intrusive information, and
also protects information with social value that outweighs its
intrusiveness.332
330. See supra Part IV.C.3.
331. For example, the picture of a woman mourning the loss of her dead son in a
hospital is most likely newsworthy. This is because the picture is of social use, since it is
substantially related to an issue of legitimate public concern (gang warfare).
Additionally, the intrusiveness is minor when balanced against the social use. However,
if the mother's intimate statements to her dead son are added as a caption to the picture,
the social use of the picture remains unchanged, but the intrusiveness has increased. In
this case, the intrusiveness most likely outweighs the social use, and the resulting
picture/caption is no longer newsworthy. Yet, in this and other scenarios, a jury should
make the ultimate determination of the disclosure's newsworthiness.
332. For example, broadcasting the results of a drug test involving a truck driver
most likely would not be newsworthy. Although the facts would be of social use
(substantially related to highway safety), the intrusiveness of the facts (revealing the
results of a private work-related drug test in an interview on national television) would
likely outweigh their social use. However, such is not the case with an athlete failing a
drug test during the sporting season. In this case, the social use of the information
(substantially related to the issue of athletic authenticity) most likely outweighs the
intrusiveness of the prying (athletes are aware of their public figure status and the
interest surrounding athletic authenticity). Thus, the information is newsworthy despite
the intrusiveness. Likewise, the results of a drug test involving a politician would also
be newsworthy (the social use of an elected official's criminal misdeeds would outweigh
the intrusiveness of the information). Yet, as in the above and other scenarios, a jury
should make the ultimate determination of the disclosure's newsworthiness as a question
The proposed newsworthiness standard also provides a definite
standard in distinguishing between a matter of public interest and the
identity of a person involved in a matter of public interest. Past cases
reveal an almost ad hoc determination of this question by the lower
courts.3 ' However, the proposed test deals with this question by
balancing the social use of the information against the associated prying
into a person's private life. 4 Simply stated, the greater the prying, the
less likely a person's identity would be a matter of legitimate public
concern.
3 5
b. Burden of Proof-Public or Private Plaintiff?
(1) Voluntary Public Plaintiff
It is generally accepted that people who have voluntarily ascended to a
position of fame have fewer privacy interests than an otherwise
unknown private citizen.336 Because of the prominent position of public
persons in society, there is a strong First Amendment urge to shield
reporting on such persons. In recognition of this, under the test
proposed here, a voluntary public figure would be required to prove, as
an element of the private facts tort, that the disclosed facts were not
newsworthy.
The proof standard for a voluntary public plaintiff does not differ from
the current status of private facts jurisprudence, and is similar to the
Supreme Court's treatment of defamation cases.337 There is a strong
of fact.
333. See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
334. As with any balancing test, the proposed test is subject to criticism on the
grounds of trying to weigh "apples against oranges." Nevertheless, due to the
importance of the competing interests at stake, a balancing test may be the only way to
protect both interests without either disregarding the right to privacy or
unconstitutionally restricting free speech. Despite the lack of a common denominator, a
reasonable juror is capable of determining when intrusiveness outweighs an item's social
use. An additional protection in difficult cases is the burden of proof allocation between
public and private plaintiffs. See infra Part V.B.1.b.
335. However, this simple example may not always be the case. Juries may, and
should, tolerate a higher degree of prying when the information is of very important
social use. Obviously, the most difficult cases will certainly arise when both the degree
of prying and the social use of the information are great.
336. See, e.g., RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 652D cmt. e (1977).
One who voluntarily places himself in the public eye, by engaging in public
activities, or by assuming a prominent role in institutions or activities having
general economic, cultural, social or similar public interest, or by submitting
himself or his work for public judgment, cannot complain when he is given
publicity that he has sought, even though it may be unfavorable to him.
Id.
337. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (requiring
[VOL. 36: 489, 1999] The Tort that Refuses to Go Away
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEV
desire for active, public debate concerning public figures in our society.
By placing the burden of proof with respect to newsworthiness (or, more
precisely, lack thereof), on public plaintiffs, the proposed test would
grant the necessary breathing space for newsworthy reporting.
Additionally, the risk of the disclosure of private, newsworthy facts is a
risk assumed by becoming a voluntary public figure.
(2) Private or Involuntary Public Plaintiff
As in defamation cases, not all persons should be subject to the same
level of media scrutiny.3" Thus, under the proposed standard for
newsworthiness, a private or involuntary public figure3 9 would not be
required to prove the lack of newsworthiness as an element of the private
facts tort. But, in cases involving such private or involuntary public
figures, newsworthiness would serve as an absolute defense. In other
words, the burden of proof regarding newsworthiness would shift to the
defendant in private or involuntary public plaintiff cases.m
a showing of actual malice for a public plaintiff to recover from a media defendant); see
also Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (extending constitutional
protection to statements regarding public figures as well).
338. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (allowing, in non-
public plaintiff cases, a lesser standard of proof in proving defamation against media
defendants); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
760-62 (1985) (interpreting Gertz as applying to situations involving private plaintiffs
and public issues).
339. For the proposed newsworthiness test, the distinction between an involuntary
public figure and a private plaintiff differs from the Restatement. This is because the
Restatement defines a private plaintiff as an involuntary public figure. See
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTs § 652D cmt. f (1977) (describing involuntary public
figures as individuals who, despite not seeking out publicity, have nonetheless become
the legitimate subject of public interest due to their conduct or some other reason).
However, technically the two are different. Under the proposed test, the private plaintiff
becomes public simply by virtue of the publication at issue. On the other hand, the
involuntary public figure previously became public as the result of some other
unintended event or publication, and had subsequently returned to a life of anonymity
(such as a crime or accident victim from many years prior, or even the subject of a
previous private facts disclosure). Although the distinction between the two is not
required by the proposed test (they share the same newsworthiness standard because
neither person voluntarily ascended into a position of fame), the distinction is helpful to
prevent involuntary public figures from becoming permanently labeled as public figures.
340. Because of the proposed differing burden of proof requirements depending
upon the plaintiff's status, disputes would likely emerge over distinguishing between
voluntary public figures and involuntary public figures. Unfortunately, current private
facts common law does not shed much light on this issue. However, the Restatement
does provide some guidance. Generally, a voluntary public figure intends and desires to
be in the public eye. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 652D cmt. e (1977)
There are several reasons justifying a lesser burden of proof standard
for previously private plaintiffs. First, a rich public debate on issues is
not dependent upon disclosing private, non-newsworthy facts about
private individuals. Second, involuntary public plaintiffs did not ask for
any publicity or media scrutiny into their lives. Third, facts about
private individuals are likely to be private, non-newsworthy facts.
Fourth, since newsworthiness serves as a complete defense, the shifting
of the burden of proof would still protect the reporting of newsworthy
events.
The advantage of shifting the burden of proof for newsworthiness is
that it will promote the very press self-evaluation of newsworthiness
desired by some private facts critics."I Under this standard, the press
would have the incentive to determine if private facts concerning a
private or involuntary public figure were newsworthy prior to publishing
the information. If the editors believed the information passed the
newsworthiness test discussed above, they would not hesitate in
publishing the information. However, if the editors questioned the
newsworthiness of the facts about previously private plaintiffs, they
would have the incentive to further determine the newsworthiness of the
information prior to publication.3 2
2. Constitutional Validity of the Proposed Newsworthiness Standard
The proposed newsworthiness standard of balancing the social use of
the disclosure against its intrusiveness is consistent with previous
Supreme Court treatment of the private facts tort. For example, a person
could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding a matter
contained in the public record. Therefore, consistent with Cox, the
publication of an item of public record can not be considered an
intrusive prying into someone's private life. 3  Additionally, as
(describing actors, boxers and public officials as examples of voluntary public figures).
In contrast, an involuntary public figure does not intend or desire to get publicity, but
receives it nonetheless as an unintended result of his/her conduct or for some other
reason. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. f (1977) (describing
criminals, crime victims and accident victims as examples of involuntary public figures).
For examples of public figure determination problems in defamation law, see infra note
347.
341. See Zimmerman, supra note 12, at 353 (advocating that the press is in the best
position to evaluate the newsworthiness of a publication).
342. Thus, in a close case involving a public plaintiff, the presumption will be that
the disclosed information was newsworthy. On the other hand, in a close case involving
a private plaintiff, the presumption will be that the matter was not newsworthy. Once
again, however, a showing of newsworthiness by the defendant would serve as an
affirmative defense.
343. This is because the disclosure was already a matter of public record. See supra
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supported by Florida Star, information provided to a media defendant
by a government body does not result from the media's intrusive prying
into private lives-"
Also, a brief look at past Supreme Court defamation cases
demonstrates that the differing proof standards for public and private
plaintiffs should withstand First Amendment scrutiny. In New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,345 the Court held that a public official could not
recover damages against the media for publication of false material
without proving actual malice.? First Amendment limitations on the
application of state libel laws were further extended to cover public
figures more generally in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts.34 Under the
proposed private facts test, requiring a voluntarily public plaintiff to
prove lack of newsworthiness is similar to the defamation requirement of
proof of actual malice. In both situations, the plaintiff's case is more
difficult to prove when the plaintiff is a voluntary public figure.
Therefore, if a public plaintiff can prove lack of newsworthiness in a
private facts case, finding the defendant civilly liable should not be
unconstitutional.
Likewise, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,4' the Court held that a state
could define the appropriate standard of liability against the media in
defamation cases involving private plaintiffs, provided liability was not
imposed without negligence.3 Further, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
note 66 and accompanying text.
344. This is because there is no prying when the government provides the
information to the media. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
345. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
346. Id. at 279-80. Malice is defined as making a false statement with the
"knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."
Id.
347. 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). The Court disagreed, however, if the extent of the
public figure limitation should extend all the way to the New York Times "actual malice"
standard. See id. at 162-63 (Warren, J., concurring). Additionally, courts have had
problems in defining the outer margin of the public figure category. For example,
"former public officials, professional athletes, entertainers, and celebrities of all sort"
have been regarded as public figures, as well as a former actor and the sons of the
convicted Rosenberg spies. EPSTEIN, supra note 39, at 1195. However, the Supreme
Court has held that a prominent research scientist, the wife of a prominent wealthy
businessman and a person accused of being a Soviet agent were not pubic figures. See
id. Further, other cases have determined that "large insurance companies, professional
football players, navy officers during the Vietnam War, Johnny Carson, local mobsters,
belly dancers, Nobel Prize winners, and debt collection agencies under public
investigation" were "limited basis" public figures. Id. at 1195-96.
348. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
349. See id. at 347.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,"' a divided Court held that a private plaintiff,
suing a private defendant for defamation regarding a matter not of public
concern, was not constitutionally required to prove negligence to recover
damages?5. ' Under the proposed private facts test, not requiring a
previously private plaintiff to prove lack of newsworthiness is similar to
lessening the actual malice standard for private plaintiffs in defamation
cases. 52 In both situations, the plaintiff's case is easier to prove when
the plaintiff is a private figure. 3  Additionally, because a showing of
newsworthiness serves as an absolute defense, shifting the burden of
proof regarding newsworthiness in private or involuntary public plaintiff
situations should survive First Amendment scrutiny.
VI. CONCLUSION
The recent resurgence of the private facts tort demonstrates both a
need and a judicial willingness to protect individuals from the
unauthorized disclosure of intimate non-newsworthy facts. Warren's
and Brandeis' prediction that "what is whispered in the closet shall be
proclaimed from the house-tops'' 4 has not only come true, but such
private information can now be transmitted world-wide with the click of
a mouse in a fraction of a second, leaving lives forever damaged in its
wake. Although the common law has made noble attempts to limit such
damaging disclosures, competing concerns over privacy and the First
Amendment have led to a fragmented tort that is unpredictable in its
application and potentially chilling to free speech.
By providing a comprehensive standard for determining newsworthi-
ness, the Supreme Court can further individual privacy interests while
eliminating the uncertainty of liability for disclosing private facts. A
proposed newsworthiness standard that weighs the social use of the
disclosed information against the extent of prying into personal
350. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
351. See id. at 762.
352. A possible inconsistency in this analysis is the Supreme Court's holding in
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986). In that case, the Court
held that a private plaintiff suing a public defendant regarding a matter of public concern
must prove the falsity of the statement to recover for defamation. See id. at 768-69.
However, since the truth of the disclosure is not at issue in private facts claims, Hepps'
requirement for proving the falsity of the claim should have little influence on the
proposed newsworthiness standard.
353. However, although current defamation law draws a distinction between private
and public figures, the Supreme Court has not made a distinction between voluntary and
involuntary public figures in defamation cases. But granting involuntary public figures
the same protection as previously private figures should not be a concern since the
disclosure is regarding a different issue than the event bringing them originally into the
public eye, and because newsworthiness still serves as an absolute defense.
354. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 4, at 195.
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information provides clear criteria for determining newsworthiness.
Additionally, by shifting the burden of proof regarding newsworthiness
to the defendant in private plaintiff cases, the proposed standard deters
tabloid journalism while protecting genuinely newsworthy information.
Privacy and free speech are both values that are deeply rooted in
American history and tradition. The strong roots of privacy are apparent
in courtrooms across America, where the private facts tort is flourishing
despite widespread First Amendment concerns. This Comment's
proposed standard for newsworthiness, which relies on the best features
of current privacy and defamation law, will preserve privacy values
without deterring newsworthy speech. It is a standard that, if adopted by
the Supreme Court, should quickly be embraced by the state courts in an
effort to consistently apply the reemerging private facts tort.
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